

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Please see attached for the latest edition of our graphic, "Election Security: Status of Adversary Efforts TO Influence the 2020 US Presidential Election, as of 25 August." This edition mentions **Russia, China, Iran, and [REDACTED]** Please send comments to the cc line by COB Tuesday, 1 September.

- Russia: [REDACTED]
- China: [REDACTED]

Thanks!

■

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

EEMC/RUMB/Strategic & Asymmetric Warfare

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]
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Classification: [REDACTED]
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Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Dated: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
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Classification: [REDACTED]
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Classification: [REDACTED]
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Classification: [REDACTED]
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Tab 1

- Electronic media reviewed
- People identified for an interview
- Relevant personnel link chart
- IIR dissemination flow chart (generic)
- IIR recall decision tree
- IPPG relevant sections

Tab 2

- FBI Albany IIR#1 dissemination flow chart
- FBI Albany IIR #1 recall flow chart
- Pertinent electronic communications on 09/25/2020
- Log of direct electronic communication between DAD Floris and DAD Ugoretz
- Recalled IIR

Tab 3

- Emails from Albany discussing the IIR and Director Wray's testimony

Tab 4

- FBI Albany IIR #2 flow chart
- Pertinent electronic communications from 09/26/2020 – 10/08/2020
- DAD Floris IM with OGA

Tab 5

- FITF lead to FBI Chicago flow chart

Tab 6

- IIR recall statistics from 2019-June 2025



Inspection Division Intelligence Reporting Strategic Review 07/07/2025 - 07/20/2025

FBINET

21456

Total FBINET Emails Reviewed

24289

Total Skype Messages Reviewed

27

Count of FBINET Accounts

23

Count of Skype Accounts

UNET

10351

Total UNET Emails Reviewed

692

Total Text Messages Reviewed

23

Count of UNET Accounts

16

Count of Phones

SCINET

1432

Total FBINET Emails Reviewed

14

Count of SCINET Accounts

Totals

58220

Total Items Reviewed







103

Total Accounts Reviewed

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Name	Contacted	Scheduled Date	Reinterview Time	Interview #1	Interview #2	Interview #3	Interview #4	Status
	Yes	July 10 at 3pm	July 14 at 10:30am	Serialized	Serialized	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 15 at 9am		Serialized	Serialized	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 15 (phone)	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 11 at 9am	July 14 (am)	Serialized	Serialized	Serialized	Serialized	Serialized
	Yes	July 10 at 3:30 pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 11 at 1pm	July 15 (am)	Serialized	Serialized	Serialized	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	TBD						Unable to contact
	Yes	July 11 at 1pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	TBD	July 15 (phone)	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 11 at 11am	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 11 at 11am	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 11 at 10 am	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
Nikki Floris	Yes	TBD						Unable to contact
Tonya Ugoretz	Yes	July 16 at 3 pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 14 at 10am	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 10 at 2:30pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 11 at 10am	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 14 at 11am	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 14 at 2pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 14 at 4pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 11 at 1 pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 11 at 4pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 11 at 12pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	TBD						Unable to contact
	Yes	July 10 at 4pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	No	July 14 at 5:15pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 10 at 11am	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 11 at 1pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized
	Yes	July 14 at 1:45pm	N/A	IIC Reviewed	N/A	N/A	N/A	Serialized


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IIR Dissemination Flow Chart



DRAIN Criteria – (Per RIRM, 2019)

Detailed – Each IIR must contain intelligence sufficiently detailed to be of operational, investigative, and/or analytic value

Respects the Rights of USPERs – IIRs must respect the rights of USPERs to participate in constitutionally protected activities, such as speech and assembly.

Authoritative – IIR authors, reviewers, and releasers must ensure that the source of the information in the IIR could credibly have had access to the information provided.

Of Interest – IIRs must address a valid intelligence requirement to be considered “of interest.”

New – IIRs should contain information that the USIC does not already have or cannot obtain through open sources.


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(U//FOUO) DECISION TREE

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(U//FOUO) BLG reports must be written by IAs. (For more information, see the [Bureau Control System BLUEGEM Policy Guide \[1012PG\]](#) [links to a SECRET//NOFORN policy document]).

9.2. (U) Thresholds for Raw Intelligence Product Types

(U//FOUO) All raw intelligence product types must meet the "DRAIN" threshold to be suitable for release as FBI raw intelligence reports. Additional threshold requirements exist for each type of raw reporting as well.

9.2.1. (U) DRAIN Threshold

(U//FOUO) All four raw intelligence product types must meet the DRAIN threshold. DRAIN stands for:

1. (U) Detailed
2. (U) Respectful of the rights of USPERs
3. (U) Authoritative
4. (U) Of Interest
5. (U) New

(U) For additional guidance on meeting the DRAIN threshold, see the FBI [Raw Intelligence Reports Manual](#).

9.2.1.1. (U//FOUO) Detailed

(U//FOUO) All raw intelligence reports must contain actionable intelligence and must be sufficiently detailed to be of operational, investigative, or analytical value to recipients.

9.2.1.2. (U//FOUO) Respectful of the Rights of United States Persons

(U//FOUO) All raw intelligence reports must be respectful of the rights of USPERs to participate in constitutionally protected activities, such as freedom of speech and the right to assemble. A raw report cannot solely describe activities and the expression of thoughts that are protected by the U.S. Constitution. Raw reports may include USPER information only if (1) the USPER's identity is necessary to understand the report or to assess its importance, (2) dissemination is limited to entities that have the subject matter of the report as part of their authorized functions, and (3) the identification of the USPER does not compromise any operation or investigation. The IPM (or designee) must determine that these requirements have been met in order to identify an USPER. The authoring FBIHQ division or FO does not need to obtain legal review to name the USPER unless the raw report meets another legal review trigger, as articulated in [subsections 9.2.2.3.](#) and [9.4.4.](#) of this PG.

9.2.1.3. (U//FOUO) Authoritative

(U//FOUO) All raw intelligence report authors, reviewers, and approvers must determine that the source of the information in the raw report could credibly have had access to the information provided. The credibility of the source's placement and access is specific to each report, the report author must make an assessment for each report based on the information provided by the source, as well as any information provided by subsources.

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(U) Intelligence Program Policy Guide

9.6.3. (U) Public Corruption Information Report Documentation

(U//FOUO) Disseminated PCIRs must be stored in Sentinel. PCIRs must be serialized to the INTELPRODS subfiles of the investigative Assessments or case files from which their information was derived. All PCIRs must be serialized to file 804B-HQ-C3043777 in Sentinel.

9.6.4. (U) BLUEGEM Report Documentation

(U) BLG reports must be documented according to the procedures outlined in subsection 4.6. of the [Bureau Control System BLUEGEM Policy Guide \(1012PG\)](#) [links to a SECRET//NOFORN document].

9.7. (U) Dissemination, Revision, or Recall of Raw Intelligence Product Types

9.7.1. (U) Dissemination, Revision, or Recall Process for Intelligence Information Reports

9.7.1.1. (U) Limited Distribution of Intelligence Information Reports

(U//FOUO) A limited-distribution IIR must be held to the same dissemination thresholds as a standard-dissemination IIR. Limited-distribution IIRs may only be used for circumstances in which the reported intelligence is exceptionally sensitive in nature. When drafting a limited-distribution IIR, the distribution list may not be so limited that the IIR is released to a single agency or solely within the FBI.

(U//FOUO) For more information and guidance on limited-distribution IIRs, see the [Raw Intelligence Reports Manual](#).

9.7.1.2. (U) Intelligence Information Report Revisions and Recalls

(U//FOUO) A revision is a correction resulting in the reissuance of an IIR with the same serial number. A recall uses the same serial number to announce the cancellation of an IIR. An IIR may be revised or recalled for either administrative or substantive reasons. If a report needs to be revised or recalled for both administrative and substantive reasons, the report must be labeled a substantive revision or a substantive recall.

(U//FOUO) ODNI guidelines do not allow for the modification of a subject line or the administrative page. If either change is necessary, the entire IIR must be recalled and reissued with a new serial number. Report authors must not cite the original report or the administrative recall in the reissued report.

(U//FOUO) For more guidance on recalling or revising IIRs, see the [Raw Intelligence Reports Manual](#).

9.7.2. (U) Dissemination, Revision, and Recall Procedures for Situational Information Reports and Public Corruption Information Reports

(U//FOUO) FBIHQ divisions/FOs authoring SIRs must ensure that the approved SIRs are disseminated to the appropriate state, local, and tribal LE partners. Revision and recall procedures for SIRs and PCIRs must follow the same processes mandated for IIRs in [subsection 9.7.1.](#) of this PG.

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FBI Albany IIR #1 Dissemination Flow Chart



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FBI Albany IIR #1 Recall Flow Chart

Friday, 25 September 2020



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Time (approximate)	September 25, 2025
7:23 a.m.	FBI Albany disseminates IIR 4 212 7305 20.
10:19 a.m.	Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF)-China personnel receive IIR via email.
10:27 a.m.	FITF-China SIA [REDACTED] reaches out via Skype to FBI Albany SIA [REDACTED] regarding IIR.
10:57 a.m.	SIA [REDACTED] emails IIR to FITF SC Bradley Benavides (Benavides) and FITF ASC [REDACTED]
11:59 a.m.	SIA [REDACTED] emails FBI Albany team, "I spoke with [REDACTED] earlier in case he receives inquiries from operation components at HQ, but to make sure others involved in this IIR are also in the loop, I received a call from two SIAs at FBIHQ/CD who indicated this IIR was getting highlighted within CD and they had a few questions...."
12:34 p.m.	CD DAD Nikki Floris receives IIR via email from SC Benavides.
1:43 p.m.	FBI Albany SA [REDACTED] emailed FBI Albany team, "...earlier today I had a conversation with FBIHQ IA about his IIR..."
4:18 p.m.	DAD Floris sends email to A/DAD CID Brian Cohen (Cohen), CID [REDACTED] cc'ing CyD DAD Tonya Ugoretz (Ugoretz), CyD ASC [REDACTED] and SC Benavides, "Hi team CID, Are you guys tracking this IIR? Given the topic, this is obviously going to get quite a bit of attention. Thoughts on CID adding in some additional analysts comments on this to put this reporting into context?"
4:24 p.m.	DAD Ugoretz replies to DAD Floris' email, "Thanks. This is fun."
4:35 p.m.	DI SC Kellie Hardiman (Hardiman) emails DI Raw Intelligence Coordination Unit (RICU) UC [REDACTED] "In addition to the IIR we discussed this morning, another election related IIR went out today that is creating a stir. DAD Floris wants us to work with the FITF to push out guidance...."
4:52 p.m.	SC Benavides emails SC Hardiman, "Thanks for helping us out...the NY and Albany FOs have pushed two IIRs in the past two days, neither of which should have gone out in my opinion...that said, I've asked the FITF to craft language that FOs can use directing them to coordinate with FITF/HQ on election related intelligence prior to its dissemination..." and forwards this email to DAD Floris at 5:08 p.m.
4:53 p.m.	ASC [REDACTED] emails DAD Floris and states "[i]t's first contact with a source. They were trying to get in front of the source a second time. It never should have gone out and we recommend an admin recall." DAD Ugoretz was included on the email distribution list.
4:55 p.m.	DAD Floris responds "Awesome, thanks [REDACTED] So is AL going to recall this? Just FYI, I've hit up the DI about ALL election related IIRs having to come through HQ for review. More to follow on that!"
5:06 p.m.	ASC [REDACTED] emails SIA [REDACTED] "An IIR AL sent out today is getting a lot of attention from all HQ divisions. We know that the source is first contact and hasn't been reinterviewed. Are you considering recalling the IIR until you can track the source down and re-interview? Everything election is getting scrutiny and we just want to be sure we have reliable sourcing."
5:08 p.m.	ASC [REDACTED] responds to DAD Floris, "I shot the SIA a message explaining the situation and asking them to recall, at least, until they re-interview the guy. Seems like everyone was caught off guard by it." DAD Ugoretz was included on the email distribution list.

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5:09 p.m.	DAD Floris responds, "Good deal, thanks again [REDACTED] Let us know if you need anything from us on this. Totally concur to pull this back til we get back in front of this guy. TGIF right 😊"
5:15 p.m.	SIA [REDACTED] emails ASC [REDACTED] "...We have no reason to recall at this point. [REDACTED] has been trying to recontact the CHS this afternoon."
5:17 p.m.	ASC [REDACTED] emails SIA [REDACTED] "Hey, right after I got off the phone with you, I was contacted by Cyber DAD and CD DAD. They are directly requesting it be recalled until he is re-interviewed..."
5:20 p.m.	ASC [REDACTED] emails DAD Floris, "I talked to the SIA [REDACTED]. They aren't looking to recall it, they believe it meets DRAIN. I warned them this may get elevated and they said their SAC and ASAC are aware of the interest..."
5:21 p.m.	ASC [REDACTED] emails DAD Floris, "[t]his is moving fast. He just notified me they will recall it. Boom mic drop."
5:22 p.m.	DAD Floris responds, "AAAAAAAH SNAPS!!!! Well done [REDACTED] THANK YOU for handling!!!"
5:24 p.m.	SIA [REDACTED] emails ASC [REDACTED] "Can who give me the names of the DADs so we can cite that?"
5:24 p.m.	DAD Floris responds to SC Benavides with others CC'd (including DAD Ugoretz) email regarding FOs coordination with FITF/HQ on election related intelligence, "FYI . . . we'll get this back in a box!"
5:24 p.m.	DAD Floris separately responds to SC Benavides regarding FOs coordination with FITF/HQ on election related intelligence to only FITF SC, "TY! AL going to recall their IIR."
5:25 p.m.	ASC [REDACTED] emails SIA [REDACTED] "Yup. Nikki Floris (CD) and Tonya Ugoretz (Cyber). They are over the Intel shops."
5:28 p.m.	SC Benavides responds via email to DAD Floris, "Fact or suggestion for them to recall?"
5:32 p.m.	DAD Floris responds to SC Benavides via email, "Fact. Boom."
6:14 p.m.	SIA [REDACTED] emails ASC [REDACTED] "The IIR has been submitted for recall..."
6:31 p.m.	ASC [REDACTED] emails group including DAD Floris and DAD Ugoretz, "All, the IIR has been recalled. Crisis averted! We will stay engaged for when they track the source down again."
6:35 p.m.	DAD Floris replies to ASC [REDACTED] group email, "Outstanding, thanks all!" DAD Ugoretz was included on the email distribution list.

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[REDACTED]
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT

STRATEGIC REVIEW

ALBANY IIR

07/08/2025 – 07/20/2025



DAD Nikki Floris and DAD Tonya Ugoretz
9/25/2020 Conversations

Time: (Skype -4hr UTC)	Account:	From:	To:	Summary
12:32 Local 16:32:00 (UTC)	Skype	Floris	Ugoretz	another fucking IIR went out re election security
12:34 Local 16:34:09 (UTC)	Skype	Floris	Ugoretz	4 212 7305 20
16:06 Local 20:06:26 (UTC)	Skype	Ugoretz	Floris	oh crap
16:06 Local 20:07:31(UTC)	Skype	Ugoretz	Floris	how's the sourcing on the new IIR?
16:18 Local 20:18 (UTC)	FBINET	Floris	COHEN, BRIAN [REDACTED] UGORETZ, TONYA [REDACTED] BENAVIDES, BRADLEY	Hi team CID, Are you guys tracking this IIR? Given the topic, this is obviously going to get quite a bit of attention. Thoughts on CID adding in some additional analysts comments on this to put this reporting into context? Thanks! Nikki
16:24 Local 20:24 (UTC)	FBINET	Ugoretz	Floris	Thanks. This is fun.
16:27 Local 20:27:48 (UTC)	Skype	Floris	Ugoretz	i don't even know what to say anymore
17:22 Local 21:22:21 (UTC)	Skype	Floris	Ugoretz	you all have the montly fitf stuff on yellow
17:21 Local 21:22:27 (UTC)	Skype	Floris	Ugoretz	let's rally up monday and make sure we're all good
17:22 Local 21:22:33 (UTC)	Skype	Floris	Ugoretz	im out of energy and brain power at this poitin
17:48 Local 21:48:18 (UTC)	Skype	Ugoretz	Floris	It's a plan(d)

[REDACTED]
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT

IIR (Rev. 01-25-13)

[REDACTED]

DTG: 2009252204Z
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE
INFO PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE
FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES/ROUTINE
INFO 24AF LACKLAND AFB TX/ROUTINE/
543 ISR GP LACKLAND AFB TX/ROUTINE/
AMEMBASSY BEIJING/ROUTINE/
CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE/ROUTINE/
CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE/ROUTINE/
CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//J2///ROUTINE/
CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI/ROUTINE/
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CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA /ROUTINE/
CDRNGIC CHARLOTTESVILLE VA/ROUTINE/
CIA WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DA AMHS WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DA WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DCIS WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DEPT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC//INTEL///ROUTINE/
DIA WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DIRACIC FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/ROUTINE/
DIRMSIC REDSTONE ARSENAL AL/ROUTINE/
DIRNAVCRRIMINVSERV WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD/ROUTINE/
DNI WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/
DTRA OPSCENTER WASHINGTON DC/ROUTINE/

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DATE OF INFORMATION: (U) 00 AUG 2020

SUMMARY: (U) None.

SOURCE: (U) A collaborative source with indirect access, none of whose reporting has been corroborated for less than one year.

CONTEXT: (U//FOUO) The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source, who claimed they obtained the information from unidentified PRC government officials.

WARNING: (U) SUBSTANTIVE RECALL: This is an information report, not finally evaluated intelligence. It is being shared for informational purposes but has not been fully evaluated, integrated with other information, interpreted or analyzed. Receiving agencies are requested not to take action based on this raw reporting without prior coordination with the FBI. Unless a conviction in a criminal proceeding occurs, a presumption of innocence exists for any person being reported on in this IIR.

TEXT:

(U//FOUO) NOTICE: This is a SUBSTANTIVE RECALL of an intelligence information report which was originally issued as FBI IIR 4 212 7305 20, original DTG 2009251123Z. Reason for SUBSTANTIVE RECALL: This report was recalled in order to re-interview the source. Recipients should destroy all copies of the original report and remove the original report from all computer holdings. Recipients should also ensure that any citation of the information in finished intelligence products draws on the SUBSTANTIVE RECALL of this report rather than the previous version.

TOPIC: (U//FOUO) FINT

FUNCTIONAL CODE: (U) IFC2637

REQUIREMENT: (U//FOUO) CHN2019A.I.B.7.3; CHN2019A.I.A.3.1;
CHN2019A.I.A.3.2; RUS-ANARCHIST_EXT-CD-SR-0978-20.I.C.4;
RUS-ANARCHIST_EXT-CD-SR-0978-20.I.C.2;

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BT

SENSITIVE - FOR OFFICIAL FBI INTERNAL USE ONLY

ADMINISTRATIVE NOTES: (U) Please remove the Administrative (Tickler) Page of this communication when sharing the contents of this Intelligence Information Report with any non-FBI employees as the Administrative (Tickler) Page may contain sensitive information regarding Intelligence sources and methods, FBI investigative activity, and or US Person Information.

(U//FOUO) A determination has been made by the Intelligence Program Manager that the identification of USPER(s) in this IIR is reasonably believed to be necessary to understand the IIR, convey intelligence information (e.g., imminent threat), or assess its importance. The Intelligence Program Manager further certifies that the PLA of this IIR has been narrowly tailored to include only those agencies reasonably believed to need this information in the performance of their authorized functions.

(U//FOUO) The counterintelligence and foreign intelligence PLAs with LEGAT/AMEMBASSY Beijing was utilized for this report.

(U//FOUO) DRAIN was conducted by EIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

late August 2020

ORIGINATING OFFICE: (U) ALBANY
SOURCE DOCUMENT SQUAD: (U) AL-3 CI

COUNTRY: (U) People's Republic of China; United States of America

----- SOURCE INFORMATION - PROTECT IDENTITY -----
(U//FOUO) This section contains sensitive source information that cannot be released in whole or in part to FBI personnel without a need-to-know or persons or agencies outside the FBI.

SOURCE: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

1. MOTIVATION: (U//FOUO) The source was motivated by a sense of indebtedness towards the United States after being granted asylum, and did not approve of the manner with which the PRC was governed.
2. ACCESS TO SOURCE INFORMATION: [REDACTED] The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source in China who claimed contact with unidentified PRC government officials.
3. TIMELINESS TO SOURCE OF INFORMATION: (U//FOUO) The source obtained the information on an unspecified date prior to or on 23 August 2020. The FBI acquired the information on 24 August 2020. The date of information was masked for source protection.
4. CORROBORATION OF INFORMATION: (U) None.
5. HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION WITH FBI: (U//FOUO) The FBI opened the source on 14 August 2020.

THREAT: (U) No.

OPERATIONAL AGENT: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

COLLECTING AGENT/TFO: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

GROUP: (U) None.

SERIAL NUMBER: (U) IIR 4 212 7305 20

LIAISON: FIELD: (U) None.

DRAFTED BY: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED] PHONE NUMBER: [REDACTED]

RECEIVED BY: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED] PHONE NUMBER: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) Please conduct legal review for naming a USPER in this report. Thanks. (Requested review from D9-NSLB-IIR (UC))

[REDACTED]

2020-09-23T15:39:19.299-04:00

(U) For NSCLB review and approval. (Forwarded request for review to [REDACTED])

[REDACTED]

2020-09-24T08:17:01.676-04:00

(U//FOUO) NSCLB reviewed and has no objections/comments. Thanks.

FILE UPLOAD:

(U) 802I-AL-49205-INTELPRODS Serial 207 and 800A-HQ-C1591622 Serial 175047

END OF MESSAGE

[REDACTED]

(6)

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 10:20 AM
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)
Subject: IIR --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

TRANSITORY RECORD

Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President. Personally, I am highly skeptical of this reporting based on the portions regarding COVID that veer into conspiracy theories.

Regarding [REDACTED]

- How was source found?
- What is Source's Access and Placement?
- Source's Reliability:
 - How trustworthy is source?
 - How competent/knowledgeable?
- Scale of 1-10, how confident is the source in the reliability of the subsource's information?
- Is this subsource the same one who said that the Chinese Government had underground bases in Republican states to disperse Coronavirus?
 - Does the Source believe this?

Regarding the Subsource:

- What are the subsource's age and identifiers? (not for sentinel, but to check on bona fides)
- What position and agency does subsource work for? (doesn't need to be in the IIR, but should be in Sentinel and the MATCH)
- What Access and Placement does subsource have to this information? (as detailed as possible)

=====

Classification: [REDACTED]

(2)

Newman, Katherine [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 11:00 AM
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)
Subject: RE: IIR --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

=====

[REDACTED] - Thanks for the info. I would like to send to SSA [REDACTED] the below. Let me know what you think, and I'll send it to SSA [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Thanks.

Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President. We're skeptical of this reporting based on the portions regarding COVID that veer into conspiracy theories.

Regarding [REDACTED]

- o How was source found?
- o What is Source's Access and Placement?
- o Source's Reliability:
 - o How trustworthy is source?
 - o How competent/knowledgeable?
- o Scale of 1-10, how confident is the source in the reliability of the subsource's information?
- o Is this subsource the same one who said that the Chinese Government had underground bases in Republican states to disperse Coronavirus?
 - o Does the Source believe this?
 - o Was the Coronavirus reporting received from the same identified subsource, or was it from multiple subsources?

Regarding the Subsource:

- o What are the subsource's age and identifiers? (not for sentinel, but to check on bona fides)
- o What position and agency does subsource work for? (doesn't need to be in the IIR, but should be in Sentinel and the MATCH)
- o What Access and Placement does subsource have to this information? (as detailed as possible)
- o The first IIR had a source context statement that contained - The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source, who claimed they obtained the information from unidentified PRC government officials.
 - o Does the subsource have access to PRC government officials? Or was the intelligence from one official?

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 10:20 AM
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: IIR --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

=====
TRANSITORY RECORD

Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President. Personally, I am highly skeptical of this reporting based on the portions regarding COVID that veer into conspiracy theories.

Regarding [REDACTED]

- How was source found?
- What is Source's Access and Placement?
- Source's Reliability:
 - How trustworthy is source?
 - How competent/knowledgeable?
- Scale of 1-10, how confident is the source in the reliability of the subsource's information?
- Is this subsource the same one who said that the Chinese Government had underground bases in Republican states to disperse Coronavirus?
 - Does the Source believe this?

Regarding the Subsource:

- What are the subsource's age and identifiers? (not for sentinel, but to check on bona fides)
- What position and agency does subsource work for? (doesn't need to be in the IIR, but should be in Sentinel and the MATCH)
- What Access and Placement does subsource have to this information? (as detailed as possible)

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

9

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)
Sent: Tuesday, September 29, 2020 11:29 AM
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI); [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)
Subject: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President. We're skeptical of this reporting based on the portions regarding COVID that veer into conspiracy theories.

Regarding [REDACTED]

- How was source found?
- What is Source's Access and Placement?
- Source's Reliability:
 - How trustworthy is source?
 - How competent/knowledgeable?
- Scale of 1-10, how confident is the source in the reliability of the subsource's information?
- Is this subsource the same one who said that the Chinese Government had underground bases in Republican states to disperse Coronavirus?
 - Does the Source believe this?
 - Was the Coronavirus reporting received from the same identified subsource, or was it from multiple subsources?

Regarding the Subsource:

- What are the subsource's age and identifiers? (not for sentinel, but to check on bona fides)
- What position and agency does subsource work for? (doesn't need to be in the IIR, but should be in Sentinel and the MATCH)
- What Access and Placement does subsource have to this information? (as detailed as possible)
- The first IIR had a source context statement that contained - The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source, who claimed they obtained the information from unidentified PRC government officials.
 - Does the subsource have access to PRC government officials? Or was the intelligence from one official?

SSA [REDACTED] - Can you also please send us the V file information that you and SIA [REDACTED] discussed earlier.

Thank.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

11

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 11:56 AM
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI); [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIA [REDACTED] - A new 1023 will be needed, that will have updated date of acquisition and contact, with an updated source context statement. AND it will have to run the gamut at HQ for review/approval.

Again, the reporting will contradict Director Wray's testimony.

Thanks.

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 11:37 AM
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

No re-issue of the same IIR either? If not, what is our reason for not releasing it again?

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 11:24 AM
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Gummersheimer, Molly Megan (SU) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, October 2, 2020 8:28 AM
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI); [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)
Subject: RE: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Thanks for your feedback [REDACTED]. In speaking with [REDACTED] yesterday, we are planning to release the IIR once we receive a new 1023, assuming our current understanding of all the info remains the same. We are now required to coordinate the new IIR with FBIHQ, so that's non-negotiable. The reason for the new 1023 is to show we attempted to obtain new information from the CHS after recalling the original version. If we sent out a new IIR, from the same original 1023 that was the source document for a recalled IIR, it would appear to the consumer and FBIHQ that we didn't attempt to gain new information, and to FBIHQ we might look pretty foolish because they have all the background now. A new 1023 will also give us a new date of info, but that's a very minor detail and not the primary reason we're requesting a new 1023. [REDACTED] comment about the Director's testimony was not to suggest we refrain from disseminating the IIR, rather to ensure everyone is aware of the attention this is likely to receive.

[REDACTED]
From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2020 2:16 PM
To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI); [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI)
Subject: FW: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
(U) Good Afternoon Everyone,

(U) I'm not trying to be a pain on this, but after taking some time thinking this over I just want to voice my opinion and concerns on this issue and make it clear I do not agree with the reasoning for not putting this out.

[REDACTED] Regarding the below, I'm not satisfied with the reasoning of needing a new 1023 and HQ review as these things are everyday operational and administrative requirements. Most concerning to me, is stating the reporting would contradict Director Wray's testimony. I found this troubling because it implied to me that one of the reasons we aren't putting this out is for a political reason, which goes directly against our organizations mission to remain apolitical and simply state what we know. Likewise, at the field operational level, I do not feel it is our job to assess whether or not our

intelligence aligns with the Director, rather we provide intelligence for people way above our paygrade (like the director) to make the call of what the FBI is seeing as a whole.

[REDACTED] I do agree that we have an obligation to not put out reckless information where we know something to be false or will cause undue harm. However, we are also not in a sole position to determine a reporting's validity, as we only make up one USIC agency, and an incredibly small fraction of all USIC, and other FBI Sources that could report on this matter. While it's entirely possible that our CHS's sub-source did not get this information from a PRC government source, it's also entirely possible that he did- (as just like in our own government) it is plausible that a journalist would have a source within the government.

[REDACTED] Recognizing the unidentified PRCG officials and plausibility of the information and that recipients would not have access to the MATCH section, I elected to include the following context statement:

"[REDACTED] The acquisition of the source's information passed through a sub-source who claimed contact with unidentified PRC government officials, leaving the veracity of information questionable but is being reported due to the nature of the threat being discussed."

(U//FOUO) Per the IIR PIG, "The dissemination threshold is lower for threat reporting. Concerns regarding the source's reliability should be articulated in the source byline, source context statement, and motivation, access, timeliness, corroboration, and history (MATCH) questions. This allows each recipient to independently determine whether to take action on a given threat. Sample context statements include the following:

'(U//FOUO) The veracity of this source's information is seriously doubted but is being reported here because of the nature of the threat discussed.'

(U//FOUO) I believe this allowed us to release the potentially important intelligence, while also highlighting our lower confidence in the information. However this statement was requested to be reworded prior to release, to "The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source who claimed contact with unidentified PRC government officials."

(U//FOUO) Overall, if we want to have a disagreement about meeting the elements of DRAIN, I'm completely okay with that. My concern is that I think it gets dangerous if we cite potential political implications as reasons for not putting out our information. Further, I think we are starting to drift too far into being the sole decider for the USIC regarding when information we gather is, or is not valid, or of interest to the intelligence community because it takes away the crucial opportunity from the rest of the USIC to potentially corroborate or discredit our intelligence. I think that we should at least draft and submit the IIR to FBIHQ to review, and if they decide that they want to cancel it, let that be their burden.

(U) Again, I obviously don't make the decisions, and I'm not sure if FBIHQ has provided you all with additional reasoning of why they told us to recall the IIR, but I just wanted to express my concerns. Happy to talk about this anytime.

V/r,

From: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, September 30, 2020 11:56 AM

To: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]


Subject: RE: Additional Questions for [REDACTED] Source --- [REDACTED] (AL) (FBI) [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

DRAFT

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FBI Albany IIR #2 Flow Chart



UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DRAFT

Date/Time (approximate)	
09/26/2020 12:43 p.m.	FBI Albany SIA [REDACTED] sends CID ASC [REDACTED] an email, "I've been talking with our IPM throughout the IIR process. Our current plan is to release an IIR again if the SA confirms the info from the CHS..."
9/28/2020 11:46 a.m.	SIA [REDACTED] emails Albany team, "...got a call from an SIA and UC at CD. Not surprisingly, all raw reporting concerning the election will now require HQ coordination, which was not required as of last week."
9/28/2020 11:49 a.m.	SIA [REDACTED] Skype messages FBI Albany CRO [REDACTED] regarding IIR, "Regarding the election IIR - if it comes through again and we look to re-release the info, do we have any concern about the authoritative nature of the reporting....figuring this is going to get even more scrutiny if we try to release the info again"
9/28/2020 11:52 a.m.	CRO [REDACTED] Skype message replies to SIA [REDACTED] "yes it will get A LOT more scrutiny, but the source doc has China Government....not the fraudulent licenses."
9/28/2020 11:53 a.m.	SIA [REDACTED] Skype message replies to CRO [REDACTED] "right but wondering if that info, from the same sub-source, calls into question the authoritative nature of the reporting. Trying to get ahead of the scrutiny."
9/28/2020 12:13 p.m.	FBI Albany IA [REDACTED] emails Albany team about CHS reporting, "Given the lack of specifics we received in the initial reporting, my first opinion was that the CHS wants to help and is probably supplementing his reporting via open sources which is what [REDACTED] and I were working to get through follow on RFCs and meets."
9/28/2020 3:58 p.m.	FBI Albany SA [REDACTED] emails Albany team about CHS reporting, "...advised that her/his most recent reporting-specifically regarding the fraudulent use of drivers' licenses-was obtained from an individual in China. I asked if s/he had read about the aforementioned fraudulent use of drivers' licenses in a newspaper and [REDACTED] said no."
9/28/2020 4:06 p.m.	Raw Intelligence Coordination Unit (RICU) sends email to CROs and CRAs providing RICU guidance to threats to U.S. Elections IIR reporting. "CROs, handing agents, and EIAs should coordinate with the appropriate HQ Division, notably FITF, Cyber, and/or CID's election teams, using the following email addresses, prior to disseminating IIRs on any information related to the 2020 elections."
9/28/2020 6:13 p.m.	Foreign Influence Task Force (FITF) issues lead to FBI Chicago, "In order to determine if any of the fraudulent driver's licenses seized by CBP were used to register to vote, the Foreign Influence Task Force-China (FITF-C) respectfully requests the local field office coordinate with CBP regarding the seizure of fraudulent driver's licenses."
9/29/2020 10:20 a.m.	A/CRO [REDACTED] emails CRO [REDACTED] "Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President. We're skeptical of this reporting based on the portions regarding COVID that veer into conspiracy theories."
9/29/2020 11:07 a.m.	FITF issues second lead to FBI Chicago, informing of FBI Albany IIR recall and asking for FBI Chicago to reach out to CBP, "The Foreign Influence Task Force-China (FITF-C) is providing an update to the Chicago Field Office to the lead set on

	09/28/2020 in 200I-HQ-3164550 Serial 5 where 802I-AL-5645455-INTELPRODS serial 30(IIR 4 212 7305 20) was referenced. For Chicago's awareness, the aforementioned IIR was recalled late 09/28/2020; however, the intelligence gaps outlined by FITF-C still stand regarding the seized licenses."
9/29/2020 11:29 a.m.	CRO [REDACTED] uses A/CRO [REDACTED]'s email and copies into an email to FBI Albany SSA [REDACTED], ccing SIA [REDACTED] stating, "Based on the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration, I think we should be ready to back up the IIR with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President...." And asks additional question regarding CHS.
9/29/2020 11:57 a.m.	SSA [REDACTED] emails CRO [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED] and A/CRO [REDACTED] additional information regarding CHS including new CHS reporting serialized 9/29/2020 with sub-source information.
9/30/2020 11:24 a.m.	CRO [REDACTED] emails SIA [REDACTED] A/CRO [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED] "SIA [REDACTED] IA [REDACTED] and I just spoke and agree with DMC [REDACTED] that there's nothing new to report regarding the threat to election. We will await SA [REDACTED]'s subsequent contact with the CHS."
9/30/2020 11:37 a.m.	SIA [REDACTED] emails CRO [REDACTED] A/CRO [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED] "No re-issue of the same IIR either? If not, what is our reason for not releasing it again?"
9/30/2020 11:56 a.m.	CRO [REDACTED] emails SIA [REDACTED] A/CRO [REDACTED] and IA [REDACTED] "SIA [REDACTED] - A new 1023 will be needed, that will have updated date of acquisition and contact, with an updated source context statement. AND it will have to run the gamut at HQ for review/approval. Again, the reporting will contradict Director Wray's testimony."
9/30/2020 1:14 p.m.	DI Communication sends email to all FBI Intel leaders (IPM, IPC, SSAs) providing same guidance from September 28 email regarding election-related raw intelligence reporting. "CROs, handing agents, and EIAs should coordinate with the appropriate HQ Division, notably FITF, Cyber, and/or CID's election teams, using the following email addresses, prior to disseminating IIRs on any information related to the 2020 elections....This same guidance regarding IIRs was provided....on September 28."
10/01/2020 2:16 p.m.	IA [REDACTED] sends email to FBI Albany team regarding concerns, "Regarding the below....Most concerning to me, is stating the reporting would contradict Director Wray's testimony. I found this troubling because it implied to me that one of the reasons we aren't putting this out is for a political reason, which goes directly against our organizations mission to remain apolitical and simply state what we know...."
10/02/2020 8:28 a.m.	SIA [REDACTED] replies to IA [REDACTED] email, "...we are planning to release the IIR once we receive a new 1023, assuming our current understanding of all the info remains the same....The reason for the new 1023 is to show we attempted to obtain new information from the CHS after recalling the original version. If we sent out a new IIR, from the same original 1023 that was the source document for a recalled IIR, it would appear to the consumer and FBIHQ that we didn't attempt to gain new information, and to FBIHQ we might look pretty foolish because they have all the background now...." [REDACTED] comment about the Director's testimony was not to

[REDACTED]

	suggest we refrain from disseminating the IIR, rather to ensure everyone is aware of the attention it is likely to receive."
10/02/2020 1:56 p.m.	SSA [REDACTED] Skype messages CD Special Assistant [REDACTED] "Hey [REDACTED] Long time no talk. I hope all is well! Do you have a free moment today to chat on lync? It's regarding a recalled IIR"
10/02/2020 2:19 p.m.	SSA [REDACTED] Skype messages FBI Albany ASAC [REDACTED] "I have an additional piece of intel"
10/05/2020 10:53 a.m.	IA [REDACTED] sends email regarding IIR #2 sent to SSA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] for coordination.
10/05/2020 11:00 a.m.	SSA [REDACTED] sends email to IA [REDACTED] "Done. Thank you. [REDACTED] will be singing on in the next hour or two to complete it."
10/05/2020 1:11 p.m.	FBI Chicago covers FITF Leads by coordinating with CPB noting, "Unfortunately, we (CBP) do not maintain a list of names and addresses that are found on these counterfeit licenses. Our office must take a risk-based approach to the research based on sheer volume alone. The overwhelmingly majority of these documents are procured by teens between the ages of 18 and 20 who then modify their DOB, to presumably try and circumvent alcohol laws."
10/05/2020 4:01 p.m.	A/CRO [REDACTED] Skype messages FITF IA [REDACTED] "essentially i'm getting pressure to reissue it, but thanks to the first time, we need to coordinate with FITF, so I may make you guys the bad guys, because I probably wouldn't have put it out to begin with"
10/05/2020 4:04 p.m.	SIA [REDACTED] emails CRO [REDACTED] "You may have seen the IIRis back in the queue... [REDACTED] might have to conduct that coordination and send it out as the A/CRO if the coordination goes smoothly. However, [REDACTED] does not feel the info is authoritative and would not send it out if acting as to CRO."
10/05/2020 4:19 p.m.	IA [REDACTED] emails UC [REDACTED] "I just wanted to let you know, IA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] in Albany just hit me up over this IIR....He mentioned some drama over a week and half ago and he's getting pressure to reissue it?? He's looking for somebody to coordinate with in the FITF..."
10/06/2020 3:39 p.m.	A/CRO [REDACTED] sends email "Draft Election IIR for Coordination" to CD FITF-China and CYD - Election WG. Email contained new context statement for source.
10/06/2020 4:40 p.m.	UC [REDACTED] acknowledges A/CRO email and sets up meeting for 10/07/2020.
10/07/2020 (unknown)	Skype meeting between FBI Albany and FITF-China personnel.
10/07/2020 2:53 p.m.	A/CRO [REDACTED] Skype messages IA [REDACTED] "the thing is, I dont want to put it out but am getting pressure from the supervisors and ASAC." A/CRO [REDACTED] continues Skype conversation with IA [REDACTED] "I personally wouldnt have put it out, but my CRO did and now no one wants to show up in an IG report"
10/07/2020 2:54 p.m.	A/CRO [REDACTED] Skype messages FITF SIA [REDACTED] "Hey, I want to apologize, I didnt know I was unmuted." SIA [REDACTED] responds, "Thanks for the clarity and for the apology. I totally get your perspective of wanting top cover..." A/CRO [REDACTED] responds, "between us, I wouldn't' have put it out, but my CRO did, and now I think everyone is afraid of being viewed as partisan."

[REDACTED]

	SIA [REDACTED] responds, "its nothing to do with partisanship...its legit the information and we'd be trying to drill down regardless" "but again I get it."
10/07/2020 3:30 p.m.	SIA [REDACTED] continues Skype message with A/CRO [REDACTED] "[REDACTED] another thought for you" "it could also come across as partisan putting the report out with such a strong title and no sourcing to back it up..."
10/07/2020 3:41 p.m.	A/CRO [REDACTED] Skype messages SIA [REDACTED] "it sounds like your SSAs got [REDACTED] onboard towards not putting it out, so hopefully he can convince my ASAC"
10/08/2020 2:36 p.m.	UC [REDACTED] sends email to SSA [REDACTED] SIA [REDACTED] and A/CRO [REDACTED] "Just following up, as I know you talked to some of our team yesterday – wanted to reiterate that we have not approved a reissue, specifically because of our concerns that the reporting is not authoritative. Please let us know if you'd like to continue to pursue a reissue and we can discuss next steps for continuing the discussion..."
10/08/2020 3:41 p.m.	SSA [REDACTED] emails FBI Albany SAC Thomas Relford, "The FITF China group does not want us to reissue the IIR that was recalled two weeks ago. After speaking with the FITF China team yesterday I agree with their assessment. Please let me know if you would like any additional information."
10/15/2020 (unknown)	IA [REDACTED] deletes draft IIR #2.

9.28.25

DRAFT

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:48 AM:

good morning sunshine!

do you have any read aheads for your fitf update? I'll have to leave early to go to the nakasone prep should all be fun

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 7:48 AM:

yep, let me shoot you an email!

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:49 AM:

thanks!

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:57 AM:

unrelated

do you have a serial for that IIR you mentioned to me last week re: China/

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 7:58 AM:

it's recalled

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:58 AM:

OK

talkign to PDB briefer

that's why i'm asking

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 7:58 AM:

4 212 7305 20

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:58 AM:

she is also asking if there was a revision on the russia one

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 7:58 AM:

there should have been, yes

revision to the source statement

but i haven't seen it . . . my team's not in yet to confirm though

let me check sentinel

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 7:59 AM:

OK

i looked in our system but didn't see it

but the system i use to look at your IIRs is not friendly so it might be there somewhere :)

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:00 AM:

yeah, doesn't look like they've pushed out a revision yet

for fucks sake

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 8:00 AM:

OK

The Director has the original in his book this AM

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:00 AM:

great

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 8:00 AM:

#funneverends

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:01 AM:

seriously

we're pushing out a note today to all FOs that all election related IIRs must come through FITF/HQ

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 8:01 AM:

that's good

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:02 AM:

i'm basically running a shadow government across the FBI at this point

[REDACTED] (DI) (OGA) 8:02 AM:

DRAFT

you do what you have to do

:)

hang in there

i told [REDACTED]

you just need to get thru dec

and there are a couple of weeks in nov/dec where it is a ghost town

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:03 AM:

no joke, i want to take like a two week vacay in january

[REDACTED] **(DI) (OGA) 8:05 AM:**

my goal is to take a month off - July 2021

I am sked to finish here June 2021

then I plan to take july off

that's my goal

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:09 AM:

don't leave :(

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:23 AM:

since alan can't sit in on the PDB brief, can you let me know how the convo goes about the IIRs??

[REDACTED] **(DI) (OGA) 8:23 AM:**

yes

will let you know for sure

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:23 AM:

grazie!

[REDACTED] **(DI) (OGA) 8:23 AM:**

if your bosses have an 0930, suspect the meeting will be short

we are only up to [REDACTED] and it is almost 0830 :)

FLORIS, NIKKI L. (CD) (FBI) 8:24 AM:

good lord

[REDACTED] **(DI) (OGA) 8:24 AM:**


yeah

i had a few things but i'll just pass

this always happens when i actually have a few things that might be useful to the group - lol

DRAFT

FITF Lead to Chicago Flow Chart



[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) According to Sentinel, the FBI has published approximately 1,130 Recalls from 01/01/2019 to the present.

Calendar Year	# of Substantive Recalls	# of Administrative Recalls	# of FISA-Compliance Recalls	Total # of Recalls/Year
2019	112	97	N/A*	209
2020	64	90	0	154
2021	46	120	2	168
2022	116	87	1	204
2023	105	66	1	172
2024	57	82	1	140
2025 (to date)	19	51	13	83
TOTAL	519	593	18	1,130

* (U//FOUO) The FISA-Compliance Recall was introduced in February 2020 as a separate product type for recalls related to FISA-compliance.


Albany Field Office 2020 IIR Total	86
Albany Field Office 2020 Recall Total	1

The only recall is: 802I-AL-49205-INTELPRODS 207

[REDACTED] SUBSTANTIVE RECALL - Chinese Government Production and Export of Fraudulent US Drivers Licenses to Chinese Sympathizers in the United States, in Order to Create Tens of Thousands of Fraudulent Mail-in Votes for US Presidential Candidate Joe Biden, in late August 2020

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CIA NOTE

(U) Subject:

Sensitive PRC Reporting from 2018 – 2020

.....

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CIA NOTE

(U) Subject: Sensitive PRC Reporting from 2018 – 2020

██████████ The following contains portions of sensitive reporting that was disseminated between 2018 and 2020 related to the People's Republic of China (PRC). This is not a comprehensive synopsis or summary of all reporting disseminated during that time period:

- ██████████ In mid-2018, the Chinese Communist Party's policy was to leverage all domestic and foreign elements that were opposed to the U.S. President in an effort to reduce the U.S. President's votes and make him resign or prevent his re-election. ██████████
- ██████████ Also in mid-2018, China was working to influence the results of the U.S. mid-term elections, and later the results of the 2020 U.S. Presidential elections. As part of this campaign, China was analyzing the 2016 U.S. Presidential elections and identifying U.S. states who voted for the U.S. President. The Chinese would then identify sectors within these states that voted to support the U.S. President's political party, and would attempt to make these sectors experience negative financial consequences by levying tariffs on exports to China from those sectors. The Chinese hoped that these measures would induce representatives from these sectors to lobby the U.S. President. ██████████
- ██████████ As of mid-2018, the PRC's ultimate goal with regard to the U.S. elections was for the U.S. President not to be re-elected. China found the uncertainty of the U.S. administration unsettling. ██████████
- ██████████ Separately, the Chinese Government used a number of means to exert influence over individuals it believed would speak on behalf of Chinese interests with senior U.S. officials. China regularly extended invitations to influential U.S. individuals to travel to China for speaking engagements for which they were paid significant speaking fees, along with first-class travel and accommodation. This was effective particularly with think tank officials, academics, and former U.S. government employees. The goal of these activities was to get either U.S. corporations or U.S. individuals "hooked on China." By doing so, the Chinese relied on hitting these entities in the wallet to force them to talk with the U.S. President about tariffs. ██████████
- ██████████ In mid-2019, China assessed that a means to gain advantage over U.S. policy was to direct additional, unspecified resources toward political swing states, as China assessed these states would play a crucial role for the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Along with this, it was also recommended that China apply pressure to

██
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████████████████████

CIA NOTE

financial supporters of the U.S. President's re-election campaign. [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED] Separately, in mid-2019, the Chinese Government's strategy against the United States was focused on undermining domestic confidence in the U.S. President. The strategy included efforts to use Chinese contracts with big U.S. companies to influence U.S. business leaders to turn against the U.S. President. The Chinese Government sought to identify U.S. journalists who had reported negatively on the U.S. President and pay them to write more negative articles about him. The Chinese Government wanted the U.S. President to lose the next election. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

WIRE

Published online on 01 July 2020

China: Cyber Activities Probably Prelude to Election Espionage

China is probing the presidential campaign for opportunities to tailor collection and gather insight on policy positions on US-Chinese issues. US policy on China is a longstanding high collection priority for Beijing, and Chinese cyber actors have conducted such activity in every US presidential election campaign since at least 2008, according to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] open-source reporting.

- Since [REDACTED] 2018, Chinese cyber actors known in the private sector as APT31—[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]—have targeted the personal e-mail accounts of senior US leadership, including officials in the Executive Office of the President and high-ranking officials in multiple Executive Branch organizations, Congress, and the federal judiciary, [REDACTED]
- Since 2017, a separate [REDACTED] has worked with the [REDACTED] to enable more stealthy operations by identifying the e-mail addresses of high-level US officials, then requesting that [REDACTED] obtain or crack the passwords for targeted accounts, [REDACTED]



Chinese cyber actors are targeting US presidential campaign information, probably to gather intelligence that enables future operations.

As the 2020 election approaches, the IC has detected Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors targeting the former Vice President's presidential campaign, probably to gather intelligence that could enable future operations, the first instance this election cycle that we have seen them directly targeting a US presidential campaign China has also conducted cyber espionage against other US election-related entities, [REDACTED] The IC assesses that China does not currently intend to covertly interfere to try to sway the outcome of the election, although this activity could enable such operations, if Beijing made a decision to do so.

- As of 20 May, APT31 actors had sent spear-phishing e-mails containing tracking links to the G-mail accounts of staffers associated with a presidential campaign, [REDACTED] On 4 June, Google announced that APT31 was targeting the campaign.
- Google and the FBI both briefed campaign officials on the Chinese cyber operations shortly after discovering the activity. Google officials have publicly stated that the spear-phishing attempts were unsuccessful; [REDACTED]
- During the past year, Chinese cyber actors have collected US election-related information from US voter databases, a polling data company, political and nonprofit organizations, fundraisers, and advisory organizations for political campaigns, [REDACTED]

APT31's method of sending tracking links suggests that the Chinese operators are mapping out the target network for follow-on approaches, possibly including tasking campaign staffers' e-mail accounts in the Chinese military's signals intelligence system for collection. Tracking links collect metadata such as

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

WIRE2020-05063

Internet activity and system information that the operators can use to exploit the accounts and identify other targets of interest.

- [REDACTED] Knowledge of a campaign official's operating system and software would allow cyber actors to determine whether they could quickly exploit known vulnerabilities or if they needed to develop malware to gain undetected access to the victim's machine.
- [REDACTED] If a target opened a spear-phishing e-mail with a tracking link—even without clicking on any links—it would confirm an active account for the cyber actors, potentially narrowing the target set for future [REDACTED] operations.

(U) For additional information:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Produced jointly under the auspices of the Chief of Analysis, [REDACTED] the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Security Agency.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

DOCUMENT DETAILS

CONTENTS

Produced By: CIA **Product Type:** World Intelligence Review **Document Number:** WIRe2020-05063

Publication Date: 01 Jul 2020

Contact: [REDACTED] (secure), [REDACTED] (open)

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From: [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 2:18 PM
To: [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]
Subject: RE: NSA deliberately messaging elections PDB

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]
=====

I think we have two albeit related things going on here-

- i Jeremy One, the PDB which apparently they've worded away from elections. I haven't seen the draft ([REDACTED]?) but [REDACTED]'s characterization is familiar as to what we heard a couple weeks ago (and I would be concerned as to why they are "deliberately massaging" analysis away from elections). I haven't heard that it is off but it may be further delayed pending the upcoming releases.
 - Two, there is a larger effort in NSA that they will get all [REDACTED] reporting needed for the 45 day report into [REDACTED] for ease of reporting (we have this request into all the agencies). I've asked [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to check in with the regional NIOs to see if they are making progress toward the 30 November date on the ICA draft per our email exchange with the DNI.
- [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 1:45 PM
To: [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]; [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]
Subject: RE: NSA deliberately messaging elections PDB

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]
=====

I'm not sure what to make of this.

If this is off, why does [REDACTED] say, "ok"?

From: [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:17 AM
To: [REDACTED]-DNI-[REDACTED]
Subject: NSA deliberately messaging elections PDB

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

From: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, November 20, 2020 9:20 AM

To: [REDACTED] NSA C1205 USA GOV [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]; [REDACTED]

NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

OK, thx. Regarding cross-posting into various [REDACTED] or downgrading to [REDACTED] for the 45 day piece, if you make sure there are [REDACTED] versions, we're good.

[REDACTED]

CNIO for Cyber and Elections

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer Council [REDACTED]

Office of Strategic Analysis [REDACTED]

Information & Intelligence Analysis [REDACTED]

Directorate of Operations [REDACTED]

National Security Agency

Secure: [REDACTED]

Unclass: [REDACTED]

Team email: [REDACTED]



ELECTION
SECURITY GROUP

Regards,

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, November 20, 2020 8:22 AM

To: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

Classification: [REDACTED]

All,

[REDACTED] has heard/received nothing.

We have deliberately massaged our one pending PDB to avoid any direct links to the election. The massive report we have been waiting on has been chopped up into 13 reports that likely will not get out until late next week. Many/all of them will be cross-posted into [REDACTED] or downgraded to [REDACTED] so that can be more readily incorporated into the 45-day piece, if needed.

---(U [REDACTED])---
[REDACTED]
Strategic Intelligence Analyst
[REDACTED] China & North Korea Strategic Assessments
ICemail: [REDACTED]
NSTS: [REDACTED]
Bldg/Room: [REDACTED]
---(U [REDACTED])---

From: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2020 4:25 PM
To: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

Classification: [REDACTED]

Hello All,

Greetings...just wanted to touch base to see if anyone has contacted you about this and/or if you are doing any work on this product yet. Thanks in advance.

Regards,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
CNIO for Cyber and Elections

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer Council [REDACTED]
Office of Strategic Analysis [REDACTED]
Information & Intelligence Analysis [REDACTED]
Directorate of Operations [REDACTED]

National Security Agency

Secure: [REDACTED]

Unclass: [REDACTED]

Team email: [REDACTED]



ELECTION
SECURITY GROUP

From: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 12:58 PM

To: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV

[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV

[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

Classification: [REDACTED]

All,

Greetings, hope all is well. I just wanted to send you a note with a few thoughts on this coming project. First, thanks in advance for your work on this product. Second, when you begin communicating with co-drafters across the community, please cc those on the cc line so we can maintain visibility on progress, provide assistance where needed, and help alleviate any potential problems. I also wanted to let you know that we optimally would like to keep [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Let us know if you have any questions. Thx!

Regards,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer (CNIO) for Cyber and Election Threats & Security

Cryptologic National Intelligence Officer Council [REDACTED]

Office of Strategic Analysis [REDACTED]

Information & Intelligence Analysis [REDACTED]

Directorate of Operations [REDACTED]

National Security Agency

Secure: [REDACTED]

Unclass: [REDACTED]

Team email: [REDACTED]

//

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Dated: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Dated: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Dated: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Dated: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

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Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer - Cyber
ODNI/National Intelligence Council

Secure: [REDACTED]

Email: [REDACTED]
Unclass: [REDACTED]
Unclass email: [REDACTED]
Tandberg: [REDACTED]

"The spice must flow."

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]

=====
Classification: [REDACTED]



President's Daily Brief

THURSDAY, 25 JUNE 2020



FOR THE PRESIDENT

Beijing Escalating Efforts To Shape US Policies on China

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] warn a White House official that Beijing had derogatory information on him in an effort to compel him to take a restrained approach to China, [REDACTED] China's attempt to use blackmail against a US administration official. [REDACTED] reveal the information through social media. We assess that this threat is credible. Lower level Chinese officials have recommended collecting and using "black materials" against perceived anti-China US officials since at least January 2019. This is the most detailed and authoritative recommendation that we have seen.



☆☆☆



From: [REDACTED] -DNI-
To: [REDACTED] -DNI-; [REDACTED] -DNI-
Subject: RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team
Date: Friday, November 20, 2020 1:49:13 PM
Attachments: [image003.png](#)
[image004.png](#)
[image005.png](#)

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

[REDACTED]

You have brought this to my and [REDACTED] attention and we see an opportunity to prevent an analytic objectivity mistake from happening.

Who would be the decision maker here to reconnect the thread on election security to what is about to go out?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Chief of Solutions Group ODNI/DMI/MPAC

Executive Secretary, National Intelligence Analysis Board and National Intelligence Collection Board

IC Analytic Ombudsman

[REDACTED]

SECURE
TANDBERG

UNCLAS e-mail

ICE-mail



From: [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2020 12:55 PM
To: [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]; [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team
Importance: High

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

I think I mentioned to you before that there is some pending, [REDACTED] that makes it clear China has been caught conducting election influence. At least that's how it was described to us. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] But as you scroll up, note that NSA is "deliberately massaged our one pending PDB to avoid any direct links to the election."

While this is important for your report I'm sure, it also has the potential to be a near-term issue we will need to draw attention to. This is a really good example, but far from the only one, of what I've been raising since the summer—that the IC is deliberately avoiding mentioning a connection to elections for non-substantive reasons.

Obviously since the [REDACTED] isn't released yet—they're holding it until next week—there isn't a PDB so maybe it won't end up being an issue. But this is a highly irregular way to do things, especially as someone trying to raise tradecraft and substantive objections to the mainline analysis and isn't getting our work incorporated or even mentioned.

[REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer - Cyber
ODNI/National Intelligence Council

Secure: [REDACTED]

Email: [REDACTED]

Unclass: [REDACTED]

Unclass email: [REDACTED]

Tandberg: [REDACTED]

"The spice must flow."

From: [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]

Sent: Friday, November 20, 2020 10:48 AM

To: [REDACTED] -DNI- [REDACTED]

Subject: FW: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Small update from NSA below. Their PDB isn't going to tie to the election? The mind boggles.

Director, Election Threat Analysis
National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

From: [REDACTED]-DNI-
Sent: Friday, November 20, 2020 10:02 AM
To: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]@nsa [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED]
USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA
[REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA
GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]@nsa [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]
NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]
NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA
[REDACTED] USA GOV [REDACTED] NSA [REDACTED] USA GOV
[REDACTED]
Subject: RE: (U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

Thanks [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

I haven't heard from the China drafting group yet either. My impression is that they've been waiting for the new [REDACTED]/PDB to update the story before feeding that into the ICA. I don't want to preempt what the reports or PDB will say, but with the ICA in mind, I really think we need to comment on how the new information relates to the election story or not—customers will want and expect that from us. NIO Cyber and I think the new info is highly relevant, though I realize we're in the minority there. I understand you're trying to navigate various perspectives on this, so just fyi. Happy to discuss further.