

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION****Electronic Communication****Title:** (U) Searches on [REDACTED]**Date:** 03/31/2022**CC:** [REDACTED]**From:** DETROIT

DE-I17

Contact: [REDACTED]**Approved By:** [REDACTED]**Drafted By:** [REDACTED]**Case ID #:** 56D-DE-3407960(U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

STATE OF MICHIGAN;

CDPO - ELECTION LAWS

SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE MATTER

Synopsis: (U) Searches on [REDACTED]**Details:**

(U) On 22 March 2022, writer conducted searches in Accurint, Clear, and through the Secretary of State on [REDACTED] to determine if the information on his voter registration form is fraudulent. The returns are included below:

- (U) There were no returns for [REDACTED] with the date of birth listed on the voter registration [REDACTED]
- (U) The address listed on the voter registration form is not a residence in Muskegon Michigan and the zip code for the street is incorrect.
- (U) The phone number on the voter registration form is inactive and does not return to [REDACTED]

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[EXTERNAL EMAIL] - RE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (CRM) <[REDACTED]>

Thu 11/4/2021 9:07 AM

To: [REDACTED] (FBI)

Cc: [REDACTED] AMIW) <[REDACTED]>

I understand, based on previous calls with you and the USAO in the Western District of Michigan ([REDACTED] copied here) and other information provided by both, that your respective offices have evaluated the [REDACTED] matter and are not seeking further investigative or prosecutive action at this time. Based on the information provided previously, PIN agrees with that conclusion.

Please let me know if you have any questions or issues to discuss further. Thank you.

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>

Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 2021 10:28 AM

To: [REDACTED] (CRM) <[REDACTED]>

Subject: [REDACTED]

Hello [REDACTED]

We previously discussed the current state of the [REDACTED] investigation, the results of our financial review, and the content of the Michigan Attorney General's Office casefile that was provided to us. Would you be able to provide an undated letter regarding DOJ/PIN's view on concurrence/nonconcurrence?

Please don't hesitate to call with any questions or if you need additional information.

Thanks,

From: [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI)
Sent: Thursday, August 12, 2021 1:29 PM
To: [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI)
Subject: FW: [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (USAMIW) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Thursday, August 12, 2021 1:28 PM
To: [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - RE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has informally advised us that no further action should be taken in this District at this time. He will send us an official response, which I will pass along when received. I do not know the status of any authorization for the Eastern District investigation.

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Friday, July 30, 2021 10:14 AM
To: [REDACTED] (USAMIW) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: [REDACTED]

Have you heard anything?

From: [REDACTED] (USAMIW) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, July 20, 2021 8:50:43 AM
To: [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - RE: [REDACTED]

Yes. [REDACTED] said he needed to talk to his supervisor and would get back to us this week.

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, July 20, 2021 8:26 AM
To: [REDACTED] (USAMIW) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: Re: [REDACTED]

Have you spoken to PIN?

From: [REDACTED] (USAMIW) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Monday, June 28, 2021 10:39:44 AM
To: [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL EMAIL] - FW: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This is the authorization we received from PIN to conduct a preliminary investigation. Having done so, can you prepare a synopsis summarizing the findings to date that we can forward to PIN for further guidance? Thanks.

From: [REDACTED] (CRM) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Thursday, April 1, 2021 5:05 PM
To: [REDACTED] (USAMIW) <[REDACTED]>
Cc: [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>;
[REDACTED] (CRM) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (CID) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>;
[REDACTED] (CID) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

Good afternoon,

Following up on our recent calls, PIN concurs in the preliminary investigative step of contacting the State/local election and law enforcement authorities to gather more information about the alleged voter registration fraud. To further our evaluation of potential predication for this matter, we recommend requesting, among other information, a detailed assessment, if any, of the number/percentage of voter registrations that the election authorities determined were fraudulent or inaccurate, and a detailed assessment, if any, of the types of fraudulent or inaccurate information included in those registrations (e.g., fictitious names, non-existent or incorrect residential addresses, etc.). Please consult again if and when your office or the FBI seeks to pursue additional investigative action. No federal public statement should be made about this matter.

Lastly, please advise us if there are any pending election contests (including litigation contesting the results of the elections) in the relevant jurisdictions that relate to the same facts that are the subject of your investigation, so that we may further discuss how to proceed. Please also advise us if any of the candidates in the relevant election, or any of their representatives, have contacted or have attempted to contact any prosecutor or agent working on this matter concerning this matter, as such contact or attempted contact may raise additional legal or ethical issues.

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (CRM)
Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 1:16 PM
To: [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Cc: [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (USAMIW) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (CRM) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Following up on this email and our recent phone calls, PIN concurs in proceeding with a full field, grand jury investigation into the allegations involving the "blue cards." PIN does not concur at this time, barring further predication, with a specific investigation focused purely on the voter registration fraud that has been investigated by State law enforcement officials. Please consult again if and when your office or the USAO seeks to pursue criminal charges or lacks venue for any criminal conduct. No federal public statement should be made about this matter.

Lastly, please advise us if there are any pending election contests (including litigation contesting the results of the elections) in the relevant jurisdictions that relate to the same facts that are the subject of your investigation, so that we may further discuss how to proceed. Please also advise us if any of the candidates in the relevant election, or any of their representatives, have contacted or have attempted to contact any prosecutor or agent working on this matter concerning this matter, as such contact or attempted contact may raise additional legal or ethical issues.

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Sent: Thursday, February 11, 2021 4:56 PM
To: [REDACTED] (CRM) <[REDACTED]>
Cc: [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>; [REDACTED] (DE) (FBI) <[REDACTED]>
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]

Good afternoon [REDACTED]

Per our conversation earlier:

On October 5, 2020, the City of Muskegon Clerk's Office started receiving voter registration applications that were flagged as potentially fraudulent. Concerns included: Addresses that did not exist, invalid phone numbers, signature matching issues, and same/similar handwriting on multiple applications. These applications came from the same company [REDACTED] and from either [REDACTED] October 8, 2020, [REDACTED] came in person to drop off more applications. These applications contained similar issues and were from [REDACTED] identified she worked for [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. In total about 8,000 to 10,000 applications were mail [REDACTED]

Muskegon City Police and the Michigan State Police / Michigan Attorney General's Office subsequently opened an investigation into [REDACTED]. On October 29, 2020, The Michigan State Police executed a search warrant at [REDACTED]. Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were able to view to site during the search and noted a number of boxes with "blue cards" or some other re-loadable debit cards. Subsequent interviews conducted by Michigan State Police indicated [REDACTED] used these cards to pay workers bringing in voter applications.

[REDACTED] is in the Eastern District of Michigan, Muskegon is in the Western District of Michigan.

If you have any further questions, please let me know.

V/r



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(U) [REDACTED]

STATE OF MICHIGAN;

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of entry 12/15/2023

On December 12, 2023, Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] interviewed [REDACTED] DOB [REDACTED] SSAN [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] worked for [REDACTED] in 2020. He was tasked to find people who were not registered to vote and to do whatever he could to get those people to sign up to vote. [REDACTED] girlfriend, [REDACTED] worked for [REDACTED] and recruited [REDACTED] to join her by showing him how much money [REDACTED] could make. [REDACTED] would make \$700-\$800 a week.

[REDACTED] had an office on [REDACTED] near [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] wore a green shirt with [REDACTED] on it. There was an older white guy, possibly named [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] and a black lady named [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] who would task employees daily. [REDACTED] initially drove a van to drop off workers; she dropped off [REDACTED] several times before she moved on to a different position. [REDACTED] was dropped off at different locations around Muskegon daily to find people to register to vote. Some people would register on more than one occasion.

At the end of each shift, all of the applications were turned over to the supervisors. [REDACTED] was never asked to, nor did he, ever fraudulently fill out any applications. [REDACTED] was paid hourly, not by the number of applications. [REDACTED] knew some people got more money for more signatures. Some people had their friends sign duplicate applications. If you were good at your job, you might get a promotion to driver or supervisor. There was not a quota for each shift/day.

Some people thought [REDACTED] worked for Joe Biden. If they were not getting people to register to vote, [REDACTED] and others, were tasked to go door to door to hang fliers saying to vote for Biden.

Something seemed "off" to [REDACTED]. After a short time working for [REDACTED]

Investigation on 12/12/2023 at [REDACTED] (In Person)

File # 56D-DE-3407960

Date drafted 12/12/2023

by [REDACTED]

56D-DE-3407960

Continuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of [REDACTED], On 12/12/2023, Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED] he quit. It was weird to find people who needed to register to vote, then to put up fliers for people to vote for Biden. After a while, [REDACTED] heard that the [REDACTED] building was raided by the police.

[REDACTED] knew a lot of people who also worked for [REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] brothers were really into it. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] also worked there.

[REDACTED] confirmed he filled out and signed a Canvasser Contract while working for [REDACTED] (attached as a digital 1A).

SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT AGENCY

PRC

U.S. Presidential Election-related Intelligence in 2020;
Publicly Available Information from U.S. Government Website

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]

PRC

increase of U.S. Presidential
election-related intelligence, collected publicly available information from a U.S.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] learned from public

sources that information published on [REDACTED] on the U.S. [REDACTED] website [REDACTED] 2020 U.S. Presidential election infographics and products. [REDACTED] the [REDACTED] infographics and products, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] the products consisted of [REDACTED] infographics and [REDACTED] maps, which would provide election officials, interested parties, and voters with information for mail-in voting, post-election, and election returns procedures, as these procedures differed according to state or administrative jurisdiction area, or both. [REDACTED] the products provided procedures to implement countermeasures for rumors, and to safeguard the 2020 U.S. Election. [REDACTED] U.S. Presidential election information products were:

- mail-in voting processing map, [REDACTED], and provided a visualization of each state's mail-in voting procedures;
- mail-in voting 2020 policy change map, [REDACTED] a map [REDACTED] state's changes stemming from the COVID-19 epidemic;
- mail-in voting election [REDACTED] safeguards infographic, [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] a post-Presidential Election process timetable from [REDACTED] Election Day 2020 through [REDACTED] Inauguration Day; and
- election results reporting risks and mitigation measures [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SENSITIVE GOVERNMENT AGENCY

[REDACTED]) PRC [REDACTED] : PRC [REDACTED]
Possesses List of Likely Leaked, Compromised Data that
Included U.S., [REDACTED] Entities in [REDACTED]
2019; Data Sets Apparently Include Those Related to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], and Voter Data / PII

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]) A PRC [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] was in possession of a document as of [REDACTED] 2019 that contained a list of [REDACTED] entities
and the data [REDACTED] yielded. While a comparatively small portion of the list's entries featured
entities in [REDACTED] the U.S., most of the entries were targets in other countries. The
data was primarily dated from between 2009 and 2018, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Of particular note, the majority of the entities consisted of [REDACTED] data sets of personally
identifiable information (PII), potentially indicating that the bulk collection of such PII had been their goal.
Furthermore, these PII-related data sets included several characterized as voter registration records.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]-possessed a document as of [REDACTED] 2019 that listed some [REDACTED] data sets, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Of particular note, this list included 97 entries that were
explicitly identified as originating from U.S., [REDACTED] entities--though the majority of [REDACTED] list
consisted of data from other countries, with the entries' descriptions indicating that most of the data came from
[REDACTED]. The list appeared to be organized based on certain factors-- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Most
of the data involved private companies, government organizations, and NGOs.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

([REDACTED]) U.S. Voter, Election-Related Data

[REDACTED]

Name	Data Volume	Date of Information	Apparent Contents
Unspecified U.S. voter data ⁽⁵⁾	204,822,241 records (45 GB)	2016	Includes voters' names , ages, phone numbers, addresses, etc. A file, downloaded by [REDACTED] on [REDACTED], indicated his possible possession of this data as well.
Named U.S. state 1 voter database ⁽⁵⁾	1,746,069 records	2017	Includes voter IDs, full names, current addresses, previous addresses, birth dates , gender, and phone numbers.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

■ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
■ [REDACTED]
■ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Named U.S. state 2 voter database ⁽⁵⁾	7,893,248 records	2017	Includes voter IDs, full names, current addresses, former addresses, birth dates, gender, and citizenship information.
Named U.S. state 3 voter database	5,578,302 records (6+ GB)	2017	
Named U.S. state 4 voter database	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Named U.S. state 5 voter database	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Named U.S. state 6 voter database	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Named U.S. state 7 voter database	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Named U.S. state 8 voter database	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Emails from a named U.S. person ⁽⁵⁾	7.42 GB	2016	Includes election-related materials

U.S.-Origin PII

Name	Data Volume	Area	Date of Information	Apparent Contents
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5

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Unspecified U.S. citizen medical database ⁽⁵⁾	28 million records [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] social security numbers. [REDACTED]
Named U.S. medical group's servers and important data	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Named U.S. biogenetics group	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Named U.S. school	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Named U.S. business services company 1 ⁽⁵⁾	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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() Compromised Websites

()

Name	Data Volume	Date of Information	Apparent Contents
Named U.S. business services company 2's complaints website	records	2016	Unknown
data from named U.S. business services company 3 ⁽⁵⁾			
data from named U.S. business services company 4	records		Data that is unable to be updated
Named U.S. web services company 1	records		Includes email addresses, passwords and data.
Named U.S. web services company 2			
Named U.S. web services company 3	records		Includes domain names, registered email addresses, login IDs, passwords, account numbers, dates of registration, etc.
Named U.S. web services company 4	records	2017	Data unable to be updated

5.

Page 6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

			[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]) Social Networking Websites

[REDACTED]

Name	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] records	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] records		[REDACTED]
Named U.S. social networking company 1 (5)	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Named U.S. social networking company 2 (5)	[REDACTED] records	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Named U.S. social networking company 3	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Named U.S. social networking company 4	[REDACTED]		[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

			[REDACTED]
Named U.S. social networking company 5	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Named U.S. social networking company 6	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Account information from named U.S. social networking company 6	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

(U//F [REDACTED]) U.S. NGOs, Religious Groups, and Professional Organizations

[REDACTED]

Name	Data Volume	Date of Information	Apparent Contents
Named U.S. labor organization 1 [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

			[REDACTED]
Named U.S. trade association 1	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Named U.S. think tank 1 (5)	Unknown	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
Named U.S. travel company	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

(U [REDACTED]) Other Private U.S. Entities

[REDACTED]

Sector	[REDACTED]
Industry	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
U.S. Think Tanks	[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Software	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U/[REDACTED]) United States Government Entities

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

			[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] United States Government Data

[REDACTED]

Name	Data Volume	Date of Information	Apparent Contents
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[REDACTED]

Named U.S. publisher	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] 2017	Military maps and records in PDF format
((publicly released information about alleged NSA intelligence collection activities)) ⁽⁵⁾	[REDACTED]	2013 - 2016	Publicly leaked U.S. data
Publicly leaked emails from a named former U.S. official	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
F-15-Related Data ⁽⁵⁾	[REDACTED] and more	1998 - 2012	Downloaded data from a [REDACTED] computer--such as the initial evaluations F-15 fighter jet maintenance and technical manual, and other documentation dated between 1998 and 2012
Named U.S. cleared defense contractor 1	[REDACTED] documents and [REDACTED] database records in a TXT file ([REDACTED])	2015 - [REDACTED] 2017	A U.S. [REDACTED] service contractor, with a catalog
Named U.S. cleared defense contractor 2	[REDACTED] documents and [REDACTED] documents ([REDACTED])	2012	A U.S. [REDACTED] service contractor
Named U.S. cleared defense contractor 3	[REDACTED]	2013	A U.S. [REDACTED] service contractor
Named U.S. cleared defense contractor 4	[REDACTED] attachment [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] emails	2015	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: (U) RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic
Date: Thursday, September 03, 2020 10:09:59 AM

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]
=====

I am concerned about politics seeping into this. There's no reason we can't say that we have [REDACTED] confidence, etc. That they have a preference. I don't disagree that the consensus view is most likely, but I strongly disagree that we can be so confident about it given [REDACTED] and all that has happened since then. I am troubled by CIA's comments at the recent COI.

[REDACTED]
National Intelligence Officer - Cyber
ODNI/National Intelligence Council

Secure: [REDACTED]
Email: [REDACTED]
Unclass: [REDACTED]
Unclass email: [REDACTED]
Tandberg: [REDACTED]

"The spice must flow."

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, September 3, 2020 8:56 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: (U) RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]
=====

Is it just me, or are they basically saying we should self-censor our assessment on preference because it could be misused? They do have a preference, [REDACTED] that they're acting on that preference and we assess they think it's probably not worth the risk. If we can't communicate our thinking clearly, maybe we should just quit and go home.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Subject: RE: (U) RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic --- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]
=====

Good evening,

FBI concurs on both the edit to the [REDACTED] language from [REDACTED] and with CIA and INR's language edits and concerns.

We've expressed our concern in coord on multiple products that the preference line, when included as a top line in products that are explicitly election related, could imply the opposite of the what community consensus seems to be – namely that activities are focused on policy preferences and that election related activity is not worth the risk.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Unit Chief

Foreign Influence Task Force – China

[REDACTED] (desk)

[REDACTED] (secure)

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 5:45 PM

To: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: (U) RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification: [REDACTED]

In regard to the [REDACTED] sentence, I think if we are going to raise that we also need to preserve some of the caveats noted in the [REDACTED], especially if we use the NIC's proposed language.

"Unidentified pro-China influence actors [REDACTED] have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that criticize the President's policies, promote socially divisive themes, and denigrate him, [REDACTED]"

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] s // [REDACTED] u

[illegible]

Cc: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Hi [REDACTED]

Thanks for offering your thoughts. At this point, I'm not sure it would be productive for me to address them one by one, though I do think you're mischaracterizing what it is we're asking for and our rationale for it.

We were hoping to avoid a dissent, hence this long email chain. Especially because the edits we'd like to see are about inserting IC-coordinated language, adding a caveat to a judgment but not changing it, and describing some relevant online content. In my experience, those are the types of things that can and should be worked out in coordination. But if we can't resolve them here, then we can consider a dissent.

[REDACTED]
Director, Election Threat Analysis
National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, September 02, 2020 4:33 PM
To: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic --- [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

INR supports using the original language.

Additionally, we want to highlight three concerns that we have here at INR as we've watched this exchange:

- [REDACTED] we believe our evidence for China not interfering in the U.S. election is stronger than you are acknowledging. We can and should make a judgement call about whether China is interfering, not leave it up to the reader to read between the lines.
 - [REDACTED] should not be used to justify a conclusion that "it could be happening but we just don't see it." This sets an artificially high bar for evidence—that we must possess empirical evidence to *disprove any possible alternative outcome*. This flawed logic could be used to justify any conceivable argument one wants to make, and implies more uncertainty than actually exists. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
 - In this case, we actually *do* possess positive evidence about China's intent—and it suggests China probably is not interfering in the election. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- China's influence efforts to shift public opinion on particular policy issues are not the same as election interference, nor are they intended to influence the election. We object to language that blurs the line between these two activities and implies interference is happening, without stating it directly.
- Lastly, based on the last interagency call and lack of dissent to the original draft, it appears there is relative consensus within the China-watching community (INR, CIA, NSA, FBI) about how to describe China's activities. If the NIC election threat team disagrees, then it would be more appropriate to insert these views as a standalone dissent to the majority view, rather than rewriting the community consensus every time we publish on this topic.

Thanks, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
INR/EAP, Department of State
[REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 4:13 PM

To: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]

We think we need to keep the language on preference in. It illuminates why we're discussing China in this context in the first place and provides context for the rest of the para. That line has been IC-coordinated multiple times and briefed to a wide variety of customers—it's strange to suddenly stop using it, especially if you're going to mention risk calculus (why would risk calculus be relevant if they didn't have a preference?). This is important for providing a complete picture of China's considerations on this issue. And we have language for the other countries that shows what their preferences are. Our alternative was supposed to only apply to the second half of that first sentence, so apologies if that wasn't clear.

Thanks for putting the “pro-China influence actors” sentence back in the para. For that one, we ask you use the sentence we provided: “Unidentified pro-China influence actors [REDACTED] have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that criticize the President’s policies, promote socially divisive themes, and denigrate him, [REDACTED]” We think we need to acknowledge the partisan nature of some of that content.

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the graphic, especially since it [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] efforts. We would be fine either including the sentence we tacked on below in the paragraph or in the graphic body itself where we discuss [REDACTED] but feel a separate paragraph about it is unnecessary given the [REDACTED] around the activity. Please see below for our suggested language.

[REDACTED] We assess that China prefers that the President does not win reelection, but we have [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We assess that China is not at this time trying to influence the outcome of the presidential election in favor of one candidate or another. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This assessment is based partially on [REDACTED] as well as judgements regarding Chinese leaders' risk calculus and overall understanding of the bilateral relationship. We assess Beijing uses extensive lobbying, economic measures, information derived from computer network exploitation, and increasingly strident rhetoric to [REDACTED] press US officials and federal and local candidates to support China's positions and perspective. Beijing also continues to criticize US policies, politicians, and perceived critics to shape a political and social environment in the United States that reflects China's positions and perspectives and defend against perceived attacks by the US. (CIA Note: Removed for redundancies.) China has been expanding its broad, whole-of-government [REDACTED] influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the social, political, and policy environments in the United States and to pressure political figures at every level of government, efforts which we assess could be used to influence the 2020 election. However, we assess at this time China probably judges the risk of being caught interfering in the US election outweighs any potential gains. Unidentified pro-China influence actors [REDACTED] have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that echo Beijing's rhetoric, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Let us know if this works for you and we will move it forward.

Thank you very much for your patience,
CIMC, EAPMC, CCI

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, September 02, 2020 1:37 PM
To: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

██████████) We assess Beijing uses extensive lobbying, economic measures, information derived from computer network exploitation, and increasingly strident rhetoric to ██████████ press US officials and federal and local candidates to support China's positions and perspective. Beijing also continues to criticize US policies, politicians, and perceived critics to shape a political and social environment in the United States that reflects China's positions and perspectives and defend against perceived attacks by the US. China has been expanding its broad, whole-of-government ██████████ ██████████ influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States and to pressure political figures at every level of government, efforts which we assess could

be used to influence the 2020 election. However, we assess at this time China probably judges the risk of being caught interfering in the US election outweighs any potential gains.

We also disagree with excluding the language on [REDACTED], etc. We think this is the most notable new information on the China election story and should be addressed up front somehow in our current update. If we can't compromise on building that into the chapeau, then we'd like to add a separate paragraph with our comment on this.

██████████ National Intelligence Council note: Unidentified pro-China influence actors ██████████ have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that criticize the President's policies, promote socially divisive themes, and denigrate him, ██████████

[REDACTED] we have observed China-based actors spreading narratives regarding the election; so far, the campaigns have been small in scale, gained little traction, and were promptly shut down by social media companies. If these activities are directed or sanctioned by Beijing they could be the precursor to [REDACTED] targeting the election [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Director, Election Threat Analysis
National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, September 02, 2020 11:31 AM
To: [REDACTED]

Age Group	Gender	Percentage Vaccinated
18-24	Male	~15%
18-24	Female	~18%
25-34	Male	~25%
25-34	Female	~28%
35-44	Male	~45%
35-44	Female	~48%
45-54	Male	~55%
45-54	Female	~58%
55-64	Male	~65%
55-64	Female	~68%
65-74	Male	~75%
65-74	Female	~78%
75-84	Male	~85%
75-84	Female	~88%
85+	Male	~95%
85+	Female	~98%

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]
Derived From: [REDACTED]
Declassify On: [REDACTED]
=====

Hi [REDACTED]

Thank you for your continued engagement on this issue. Below, please see our suggested language taking on board your comments about a desire to see an increased reflection of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as well as more description about what Beijing is doing at this time. Our language below also incorporates comments we received from the IC throughout the coord process:

We assess Beijing uses extensive lobbying, economic measures, information derived from computer network exploitation, and increasingly strident rhetoric to [REDACTED] press US officials and federal and local candidates to support China's positions and perspective, but at this time is not trying to influence the outcome of the presidential election in favor of one candidate or another. Beijing continues to criticize US policies, politicians, and perceived critics to shape a political and social environment in the United States that reflects China's positions and perspectives and defend against perceived attacks by the US. China has been expanding its broad, whole-of-government [REDACTED] influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States and to pressure political figures at every level of government, which we assess could be used to influence the 2020 election if Beijing directed Chinese officials to do so. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, we assess at this time China probably judges the risk of being caught interfering in the US election outweighs any potential gains.

For transparency, below is how we parsed your suggestions:

[REDACTED] We assess that China prefers that the President does not win reelection. Although as of [REDACTED] Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election, Chinese officials have [REDACTED] that they could use to try to sway the outcome: [REDACTED]

[CIA Note: We are cutting

this because it does not parallel with the rest of the graphic, which leads with China's candidate preferences, rather than an assessment on potential Chinese actions. We also feel that the inclusion of [REDACTED] discussions is outdated for the [REDACTED] update.) We assess Beijing uses extensive lobbying, economic measures, information derived from computer network exploitation, and increasingly strident rhetoric to [REDACTED] press US officials and federal and local candidates to support China's positions and perspective, but is not at this time trying to influence the outcome of the presidential election in favor of one candidate or another. Beijing continues to criticize US policies, politicians, and perceived critics to shape a political and social environment in the United States that reflects China's positions and perspectives and defend against perceived attacks by the US. China has been expanding its broad, whole-of-government [REDACTED] influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States and to pressure political figures at every level of government (CIA NOTE: Taken from NIC language.), which we assess could be used to influence the 2020 election if Beijing directed Chinese officials to do so. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (CIA NOTE: Taken from NIC language.) However, we assess at this time China probably judges the risk of being caught interfering in the US election outweighs any potential gains. Beijing has begun incorporating election-related themes and direct mention of political candidates into its efforts to influence US attitudes and policies on China, and we assess Chinese officials are aware that these efforts could impact the election. Unidentified pro-China influence actors [REDACTED] have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that criticize the President's policies, promote socially divisive themes, and denigrate him; [REDACTED] however, we do not know if these campaigns are directed by the Chinese Government or if they are the work of individuals operating on their own. (CIA Note: We are cutting this because to our knowledge, the only campaign this refers to is the [REDACTED], which we as an IC have not finished evaluating, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], none of which we assess are authoritative. We include the [REDACTED] in the body of the graphic but don't feel it rises as of yet—pending further analysis-- to the level of inclusion in the chapeau). China has been expanding its broad, whole-of-government overt and covert influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States and to pressure political figures at every level of government.

Please let us know what you think! We look forward to engaging further on this issue.

Best,
EAPMC, CIMC, CCI

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, September 02, 2020 10:19 AM

To: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]
=====

Hi all,

Thanks for your willingness to discuss this. For the China lead para, we think that the original and the alternative we talked about yesterday are too definitive, given the [REDACTED] about the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]

We suggest the following, which is a combination of language from our recent NICA and your original. We think this better accounts for our [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We assess that China prefers that the President does not win reelection. Although as of [REDACTED] Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election, Chinese officials have [REDACTED] that they could use to try to sway the outcome. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Beijing has begun incorporating election-related themes and direct mention of political candidates into its efforts to influence US attitudes and policies on China, and we assess Chinese officials are aware that these efforts could impact the election. Unidentified pro-China influence actors [REDACTED] have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that criticize the President's policies, promote socially divisive themes, and denigrate him, [REDACTED] However, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] China has been expanding its broad, whole-of-government [REDACTED] influence efforts ahead of November 2020 to shape the policy environment in the United States and to pressure political figures at every level of government.

For the two footnotes on 2016 and 2018, I suggest editing to say "which **would have been** inconsistent with **our understanding of** its strategic foreign policy objectives **at the time**" to be clear that this is our assessment and that it applies to past years. Again, we think there is more gray area with regard to what's going on in 2020 than the original implies.

Let us know what you think. Thanks.

[REDACTED]
Director, Election Threat Analysis

National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 2020 2:17 PM

To: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification: [REDACTED]

Classified By: [REDACTED]

Derived From: [REDACTED]

Declassify On: [REDACTED]

=====

Hi [REDACTED]

Please see consolidated CIA comments on your inclusions and let us know if or when you would like to chat about the language.

Best,

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, August 31, 2020 12:54 PM

To: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cc: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Subject: RE: Please coord by COB 9/1: 4 country election security graphic

Classification:

Classified By:

Derived From:

Declassify On:

Hi everyone,

As always, thanks for the chance to coord. NIC comments are in the attachment. We'd like to see the China and [REDACTED] language again before we sign off. Happy to chat about our input on those or the other sections. Thanks.

Director, Election Threat Analysis

National Intelligence Council/DNI Election Threat Executive

From:

Sent: Thursday, August 27, 2020 3:57 PM

To:

DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]