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**Robert S Fisher
SVP – Federal Government
Relations & Public Affairs**

October 24, 2025

Senator Charles E. Grassley
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. Congress
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Senator Grassley,

I write in response to the October 11, 2025, letter to Dan Schulman, Chief Executive Officer of Verizon. Your letter inquired about the legal process that Verizon received from federal law enforcement regarding nine congressional members identified on a September 27, 2023, FBI Electronic Communication (EC) publicly released in redacted form. Thank you for giving us an opportunity to provide additional information. We appreciate the importance of these issues and recognize your valid concerns about the Senate's ability to perform its constitutional functions.

Our research into the legal process we received related to the FBI EC identified a federal grand jury subpoena, dated May 25, 2023, from a DOJ attorney assigned to the Jack Smith Special Counsel's Office. The subpoena listed 12 telephone numbers but did not include the names or any other information regarding the users of the telephone numbers. In reviewing the subscriber information for the 12 numbers, it appears that this subpoena is related to the FBI EC. This subpoena requested subscriber information and call detail records for the period of January 4, 2021 through January 7, 2021, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). The subpoena did not include a request for surveillance or seek the content of communications. Any such request would have required a warrant, which we did not receive. Additionally, the subpoena included a non-disclosure order (NDO) signed by a federal district court judge, which required Verizon to not disclose the fact that the subpoena was issued.

Verizon is required by law when served with a valid federal or state grand jury subpoena to provide the government with the limited information set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2). Subpoenas generally do not include information that explain

the facts, circumstances, or subjects of an investigation. As was the case here, subpoenas often include just the telephone number for which subscriber information or call detail records are sought. Verizon, as part of our commitment to the privacy of our customers, has a team that carefully reviews each subpoena received to ensure it is facially valid. The subpoena we received was facially valid, and we produced information to law enforcement as a result.

Nonetheless, with the benefit of hindsight and informed by Verizon's discussions with Senate leadership over the past year, going forward we are making the following changes to our practices:

- Escalation. Law enforcement demands for records related to a line known to be associated with a Sergeant at Arms (SAA) account or a current Senate member will be escalated to Verizon's legal department and a senior leader(s) empowered to intervene before records are produced. We will work with Senate leadership and individual members as needed to identify non-SAA lines (e.g., personal and campaign lines) associated with current Senate members as part of this process. Note that Verizon often does not independently know which personal or campaign accounts or lines are associated with Senate members. This was the case for multiple numbers listed on the May 25, 2023, subpoena.
- Verification. Upon receipt of a law enforcement demand for records related to an SAA or Senate member account, we will contact the requesting law enforcement agency or the appropriate prosecutor to verify the agency intended to seek records for an SAA or Senate member account.
- Challenge. If the law enforcement demand does not include an NDO, and the agency continues to seek Verizon's production of records related to an SAA or Senate member account, we will provide notice to the subscriber, to allow them an opportunity to challenge the law enforcement demand in court before producing the records. For non-SAA Senate member accounts, we will work with the Senate Sergeant at Arms on the process to provide such notice to the member. If the

law enforcement demand includes an NDO and is an SAA line, we will follow the process agreed to with the Senate Sergeant at Arms earlier this year, submitting the Sergeant at Arms' opposition to the court.

- Notice. For other law enforcement demands for personal or campaign lines or accounts associated with an active member of the Senate that include an NDO, we will provide notice to the subscriber upon expiration of the order and any known extensions of the order. We will work with the Senate Sergeant at Arms on the appropriate process for notification. Note that in the absence of an NDO, Verizon already notifies customers of civil process demands. We will continue to follow this practice for notification to subscribers, including Senate members, upon receipt of civil process demands.

The process changes described above supplement certain changes Verizon implemented this past year in collaboration with the Senate Sergeant at Arms. For example, in February 2025, based on discussions between Verizon and the Senate Sergeant at Arms, Verizon established a process to identify future legal process related to SAA Senate lines.

In addition, this summer, at the request of the Senate Sergeant at Arms, Verizon researched whether it had received legal process over the prior four years for any SAA Senate lines. Verizon identified legal process it had received for 15 SAA Senate lines. The May 25, 2023 subpoena was not on that list, even though two numbers that are SAA lines were included in the subpoena. This was a mistake due to human error recently discovered while researching the May 25, 2023 subpoena. We understand the importance of these issues and regret the error. Verizon will make a disclosure to the Senate Sergeant at Arms with this and other updated information.

Your letter inquired as to the information Verizon provided in response to the subpoena. On June 6, 2023, Verizon produced records for all but one of the telephone numbers listed in the subpoena. Verizon produced subscriber information and call detail records pertaining to the identified date range. The records included information on the billing statements for the numbers, which included the subscriber name and address; account number; bill amount; type of mobile device; time, date, and duration of calls made during the four days within the subpoena's date range; the originating and receiving telephone numbers for each

call; and the city and state of the cell tower that initially connected the calling party (e.g., Washington, D.C.). The subscriber information also included the account's contact information, method of payment, the names of authorized account users, length of service, type of phone service, phone number(s) associated with the account, and device identifiers (e.g., the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI)).

Your letter also inquired whether the subpoena was accompanied by an NDO, whether the affected congressional members were notified, whether the order is still in place, and why the affected congressional members were not notified. As noted above, the subpoena did include an NDO. This NDO prohibited us from notifying anyone outside of the company other than its attorneys of the existence of the subpoena. Accordingly, we did not notify the relevant congressional members about the subpoena. The NDO Verizon received in connection with this subpoena was dated May 25, 2023, and was effective for one year from that date. We do not know if the government extended the NDO.

Your letter inquired whether congressional members other than the nine members listed in the FBI EC were the subject of other subpoenas from the Special Counsel's office. The May 25, 2023 subpoena included a telephone number, which, based on our research over the past few days, appears to be a consumer line (not one procured through the SAA contract with Verizon) used by a congressional member not listed on the FBI EC. The May 25, 2023 subpoena also included a Senate landline telephone number that appears to be currently assigned to a congressional member not listed on the FBI EC. There were no records in the applicable date range for Verizon to produce to the government with respect to this landline telephone number.

Your letter requested that Verizon provide you with the legal process Verizon received, the NDO, and all "requests or orders" made by DOJ or a federal law enforcement agency to Verizon for the Congressional members listed in the FBI EC. The NDO itself was filed under seal until otherwise ordered by the court. DOJ would know whether the subpoena itself and the NDO remain under seal.

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We look forward to continuing to collaborate with the Senate Sergeant at Arms on these important issues and also keeping the Committee apprised on our efforts. We can provide your staff an additional update on the new process changes described above at the right time. Please do not hesitate to reach out to me if you have additional questions.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. S. Fisher". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Robert" and last name "Fisher" clearly distinguishable.

Robert S. Fisher
SVP – Federal Government
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