



May 6, 2025

The Honorable Kristi Noem
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary Noem:

We write to request a comprehensive threat assessment from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) regarding the People's Republic of China's (PRC) expanding intelligence and security collaboration with the Republic of Cuba (Cuba). Publicly available satellite imagery, open-source intelligence, and independent technical analysis strongly indicate that the PRC is establishing, or has already established, sophisticated signals intelligence (SIGINT) infrastructure in Cuba.¹ The presence of such capabilities just 90 miles from the United States represents a serious and evolving threat to the homeland.

The security risks posed by these developments are particularly acute across the air, space, and maritime domains. By fusing telemetry interception, geospatial intelligence collection, and electromagnetic surveillance, the PRC is positioning itself to systematically erode U.S. strategic advantages without ever firing a shot. The geographic proximity of suspected PRC-linked facilities in Cuba to sensitive U.S. installations, including Naval Station Guantánamo Bay, Kennedy Space Center, Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, and Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, may enable the PRC to monitor American detection and response capabilities, map electronic profiles of U.S. assets, and prepare the electromagnetic environment for potential future exploitation.²

On July 1, 2024, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report identifying four PRC-linked SIGINT facilities in Cuba: Bejucal, Wajay, Calabazar, and El Salao.³ A subsequent CSIS report in December 2024 provided enhanced imagery and analysis of the same sites.⁴ While all four locations have exhibited signs of development in recent years, the most recent satellite imagery from April 18, 2025, indicates that construction at the El Salao site

¹ Matthew P. Funaiole, Ryan C. Berg, et al., *Secret Signals: Decoding China's Intelligence Activities in Cuba*, CSIS, (July 1, 2024), <https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/>.

² *Id.*

³ *Id.*

⁴ Matthew P. Funaiole, Ryan C. Berg, et al., *China's Intelligence Footprint in Cuba: New Evidence and Implications for U.S. Security*, CSIS, (Dec. 6, 2024), <https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-intelligence-footprint-cuba-new-evidence-and-implications-us-security>.

has ceased, with previously cleared areas now showing signs of overgrowth and inactivity.⁵ In contrast, the Bejucal facility continues to undergo significant upgrades, including the installation of a circular disposed antenna array (CDAA) and repositioned satellite dishes.⁶ These features suggest a focus on long-range, wideband electromagnetic surveillance. The Calabazar and Wajay sites, situated closer to Havana, remain operational and appear to play a supporting role in the broader SIGINT network.⁷ Collectively, these developments reflect a deliberate expansion of the PRC's surveillance infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere and signal a long-term investment in asymmetric capabilities near U.S. shores.

Moreover, this activity coincides with deepening political and economic ties between Beijing and Havana. Since 2000, the PRC has provided nearly \$8 billion in financing to Cuba⁸, backing key infrastructure projects such as the Port of Santiago de Cuba and a nationwide telecommunications network largely built by Huawei and Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation, both of which have been sanctioned by the U.S. government for their roles in global surveillance and repression.⁹ The integration of these technologies into Cuba's digital infrastructure raises the specter of regional communications exposure to PRC-linked platforms.

Recent testimony before Congress from General Dan "Razin" Caine, President Trump's newly-confirmed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, further underscores this threat.¹⁰ General Caine stated that U.S. Cyber Command's hunt-forward operations, which deploy at the invitation of foreign governments, have uncovered PRC malware implanted within Latin American networks.¹¹ These discoveries within the U.S. Southern Command's area of responsibility reinforce longstanding concerns about the PRC's malign cyber activity in the Western Hemisphere. Notably, reports of PRC technicians and advisors frequenting known or suspected intelligence sites in Cuba, suggests ongoing operational activity that merits sustained scrutiny by DHS and the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC).¹²

If left unchecked, the PRC's activities in Cuba could establish a forward operating base for electronic warfare, enable intelligence collection, and influence operations that directly undermine U.S. national security interests. The location of Cuba offers the PRC a platform to monitor U.S. military movements, disrupt critical communications in the event of a crisis, and shape political dynamics throughout the region to its advantage. Accordingly, and given the

⁵ *Beijing's Air, Space, and Maritime Surveillance from Cuba: A Growing Threat to the Homeland*, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec. S. Comm. on Transportation and Maritime Sec., 119th Cong. (2025) (statement of Dr. Ryan C. Berg, Center for Strategic and International Studies).

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Id.*

⁸ *Id.* at 1 and 4.

⁹ Kate O'Keefe, *U.S. Tracked Huawei, ZTE Workers at Suspected Chinese Spy Sites in Cuba*, WSJ, (June 21, 2023), <https://www.wsj.com/politics/u-s-tracked-huawei-zte-workers-at-suspected-chinese-spy-sites-in-cuba-355caddc>.

¹⁰ *To consider the nomination of: Lieutenant General John D. Caine, USAF (Retired) to be general and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 119th Cong. (April 1, 2025), (testimony of Lieutenant General John D. Caine, USAF (Retired)).

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Id.* at 9.

seriousness of these developments, we respectfully request that DHS provide a classified briefing and a detailed written update addressing the following:

1. The Department's current assessment of the PRC's intelligence-gathering operations in Cuba, including known or suspected SIGINT capabilities;
2. Any known or suspected infrastructure developments, upgrades, or PRC-linked construction at Cuban military or dual-use facilities;
3. The Department's efforts to assess and mitigate risks to the homeland from potential SIGINT interception of communications from DHS components, partner agencies, or U.S. critical infrastructure;
4. The extent and effectiveness of DHS's interagency coordination efforts, particularly with the Department of Defense, the IC, and the Department of State, to monitor, analyze, and counter PRC intelligence and security activities in Cuba, the broader Caribbean, and the Western Hemisphere. This should include an overview of existing mechanisms for information sharing, joint threat assessments, coordinated response planning, and any identified gaps or challenges that may impede a unified U.S. government response; and
5. Steps taken by DHS to raise awareness among industry and government entities about risks related to PRC surveillance platforms in Cuba.

Per Rule X of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Committee on Homeland Security is the principal committee of jurisdiction for overall homeland security policy and has special oversight of "all Government activities relating to homeland security, including the interaction of all departments and agencies with the Department of Homeland Security."

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party has broad authority to "investigate and submit policy recommendations on the status of the Chinese Communist Party's economic, technological, and security progress and its competition with the United States" under H. Res. 11.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter and your prompt reply.

Sincerely,



MARK E. GREEN, M.D.
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security



JOHN MOOLENAAR
Chairman
Select Committee on the CCP



CARLOS A. GIMENEZ
Chairman
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security
Committee on Homeland Security



SHERI BIGGS
Member of Congress



ELIJAH CRANE
Member of Congress

cc: The Honorable Bennie Thompson, Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Raja Krishnamoorthi, Ranking Member
Select Committee on the CCP

The Honorable LaMonica McIver, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security
Committee on Homeland Security