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ONE HUNDRED NINETEENTH CONGRESS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

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April 24, 2025

Mr. Liang Wenfeng
Chief Executive Officer
DeepSeek Artificial Intelligence Company
Rongke Information Center, No. 2
5th Floor, North Building
Beijing, People's Republic of China

Mr. Wenfeng:

Chinese companies increasingly provide American consumers and businesses with artificial intelligence services. We are concerned this poses a serious risk to U.S. national and economic security, as DeepSeek, among others, harvest Americans' personal and proprietary information and introduce new data security vulnerabilities into the U.S. economy. Under Chinese law, these companies must cooperate with and answer to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).¹ A recent public meeting convened by President Xi Jinping with business leaders underscores how Chinese technology companies can advance the CCP's priorities.²

DeepSeek's data practices illustrate our concerns. By its own admission, the company's mobile application—available on app stores in the U.S.—is sending Americans' personal information to servers in the People's Republic of China.³ According to media reports, the company is also sharing users' personal information with other CCP-linked entities, including ByteDance Ltd. Researchers, meanwhile, have identified serious weaknesses in DeepSeek's purported security controls and model safeguards.⁴ To address these risks, a growing number of

¹ See United States Department of Homeland Security, *Data Security Business Advisory* (2020), <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/data-security-business-advisory>.

² See Eduardo Baptista and Brenda Goh, *Xi's New Frontline Corporate Guard Showcases His Priorities, Control*, REUTERS (Feb 18, 2025), <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/xis-new-frontline-corporate-guard-showcases-his-priorities-control-2025-02-18/>.

³ Matt Burgess and Lily Hay Newman, *DeepSeek's Popular AI App is Explicitly Sending U.S. Data to China*, WIRED (Jan 27, 2025), <https://www.wired.com/story/deepseek-ai-china-privacy-data/>.

⁴ See Kyle Wilholt, *Recent Jailbreaks Demonstrate Emerging Threat to DeepSeek*, PALO ALTO NETWORKS THREAT RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 30, 2025), <https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/jailbreaking-deepseek-three-techniques/>;

states, including New York, Texas, and Virginia have banned DeepSeek on government devices, with states attorneys-general calling for a broader ban.⁵ U.S. allies and trading partners are taking similar steps.⁶ In South Korea, for example, DeepSeek is no longer available for download on app stores.⁷

We are further concerned by how Chinese companies access U.S. technology to advance their AI development. DeepSeek reportedly, and without authorization, trained its R1 model by “distilling” outputs from an American competitor.⁸ According to media stories, Manus AI—which its developer claims is a general-purpose agent—is powered by an American AI model.⁹ Moreover, in February, Apple announced it would integrate Alibaba’s AI features into phones sold in the PRC. This partnership has been characterized as a “vote of confidence” in Alibaba’s AI program, which is spending \$53 billion on AI infrastructure and offers a chatbot accessible by U.S. consumers.¹⁰

The Committee seeks to understand the nature, scope, and severity of the risks posed by Chinese AI companies to American consumers and businesses, as well as to U.S. national and economic security. Please provide the Committee with answers to the following questions:

1. Provide a detailed description of the types and sources of data used to train your AI models, including any U.S. personal or proprietary information.
2. Confirm whether information, including any personal information, entered into your AI applications or chatbots by American consumers or businesses is collected, shared, and used. Moreover, specify where this information is stored and accessed from,

Paul Kassianik and Amin Karbasi, *Evaluating Security Risk in DeepSeek and Other Frontier Reasoning Models*, CISCO SECURITY BLOG (Jan. 31, 2025), <https://blogs.cisco.com/security/evaluating-security-risk-in-deepseek-and-other-frontier-reasoning-models>.

⁵ See Governor of New York, *Gov. Hochul Issues Statewide Ban on DeepSeek AI for Government Devices and Networks* (Feb. 10, 2025) ; Office of the Texas Governor, *Gov. Abbott Announces Ban on Chinese AI, Social Media Apps* (Jan. 31, 2025), <https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-announces-ban-on-chinese-ai-social-media-apps> ; Governor of Virginia, *Governor Glenn Youngkin Bans DeepSeek AI on State Devices and State-Run Networks* (Feb. 11, 2025) ; Montana Department of Justice, *Attorney General Knudsen leads 21-state coalition urging Congress to ban China-based AI platform on all government devices* (Mar. 6, 2025), <https://dojmt.gov/attorney-general-knudsen-leads-21-state-coalition-urging-congress-to-ban-china-based-ai-platform-on-all-government-devices/>.

⁶ See Australian Department of Home Affairs, *Direction 001-2025 DeepSeek Products, Applications and Web Services* (Feb. 4, 2025), <https://www.protectivesecurity.gov.au/news/pspf-direction-update-deepseek-products-applications-and-web-services>.

⁷ See South Korea Personal Information Protection Commission, *DeepSeek Temporarily Suspends Its Application Service in Korea* (Feb. 18, 2025), <https://www.pipc.go.kr/eng/user/ltm/new/noticeDetail.do>.

⁸ Beatrice Nolan, *DeepSeek used OpenAI’s Model to Train Its Competitor Using ‘Distillation,’ White House AI Czar Says*, FORTUNE (Jan. 28, 2025), <https://fortune.com/2025/01/29/deepseek-openai-what-is-distillation-david-sacks/>.

⁹ Caiwei Chen, *Everyone in AI is Talking About Manus. We Put it to the Test*, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Mar. 11, 2025), <https://www.technologyreview.com/2025/03/11/1113133/manus-ai-review/amp/>.

¹⁰ Zijing Wu, *How Jack Ma’s Pivot to AI Rehabilitated Alibaba*, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar. 17, 2025), <https://www.ft.com/content/df2bccee-1730-402f-bb92-9d743018324f> ; See Alibaba Cloud, *Alibaba to Invest RMB380 billion in AI and Cloud Infrastructure Over Next Three Years* (Feb. 24., 2025), https://www.alibabacloud.com/blog/alibaba-to-invest-rmb380-billion-in-ai-and-cloud-infrastructure-over-next-three-years_602007.

whether it is shared with any state entity of the People's Republic of China or other Chinese companies, and whether this information is used to train your AI models.

3. Describe the technical, administrative, and physical controls used to secure personal and proprietary information associated with your AI offerings, as well as your process for evaluating the security of third-party service providers.
4. Provide a detailed description of any U.S. technology products or services used to develop, integrate, or bring to market your AI offerings. This includes the use of open and closed source AI models developed by U.S. companies and the "distillation" of American models.
5. Provide a detailed description of how your AI models are developed and trained, including any steps taken to influence system outputs for alignment with Chinese Communist Party ideology or political goals.
6. Provide a detailed description of any direct or indirect subsidies you receive from the People's Republic of China, or its political subdivisions, related to AI development.
7. Confirm whether your company has received a request from the People's Republic of China, or its political subdivisions, for data related to your company's AI offerings. This includes personal and proprietary data used to train or finetune an AI model and data ingested by your AI services.

Please produce this information and answer our questions as soon as possible, but no later than May 8, 2025.

Sincerely,



Brett Guthrie
Chairman
Committee on Energy and Commerce



Gus M. Bilirakis
Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce,
Manufacturing, and Trade




Russ Fulcher
Vice Chairman
Subcommittee on Commerce,
Manufacturing, and Trade



Diana Harshbarger
Member of Congress
Committee on Energy and Commerce



Kat Cammack
Member of Congress
Committee on Energy and Commerce



Jay Obernolte
Member of Congress
Committee on Energy and Commerce




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Erin Houchin
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
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